How to reverse Europe’s free-falling birth rates

In 2023, there were 1.26 million more deaths than births in Europe. This downward trend is set to accelerate, despite immigration. A new paper by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies wonders what we can do to arrest, or even simply slow down this devastating trend.

This year, the population of the EU is projected to peak at 453.3 million. From then on, however, numbers are expected to decline steadily, falling back below 450 million by 2050. That might not seem like much of a decrease, but the population will be much, much older and there will be far fewer children about. (The Iona Institute has just produced a paper of its own drawing attention to similar trends here).

Unlike financial crashes or pandemics, demographic change unfolds slowly and does not produce dramatic moments that force immediate political action. Yet the trend is clear. The difficulty, the report notes, is not a lack of foresight, but a reluctance to act on what we already know.

A central driver of Europe’s low fertility rates, the authors argue, is unplanned childlessness. Many people do not consciously decide against having children. Instead, they keep delaying family formation, only to discover later that they have missed the biological window. The absence of a suitable partner at the right stage of life plays a major role.

Societies that normalise ever-later parenthood quietly increase the risk that many will end up childless not by choice, but by circumstance. In Ireland in the 1980s, the average couple were in their mid-to-late 20s getting married. Now they are in their mid-to-late 30s. That’s if they ever marry at all. Ireland’s marriage rate is now at its lowest ever level.

In this context, the report highlights the importance of stable partnerships, and especially marriage. Across Europe, higher marriage rates, earlier partnership formation and more stable unions are strongly correlated with higher fertility. There is a simple reason for this: if you marry when you’re younger, you will probably have more children. By contrast, societies marked by delayed or fragile relationships tend to have fewer children. The decline in births, therefore, is not simply a matter of money, childcare provision or housing policy, but also of how and when adults form lasting relationships.

Despite this, the report argues that public policy and public culture remain largely silent about marriage, despite its demographic relevance.

Governments readily discuss employment, housing and childcare, yet are reluctant to acknowledge the role of long-term relationships in sustaining birth rates. The authors suggest that marriage and stable family formation should be recognised as socially valuable, instead of being treated as purely private lifestyle choices with no wider consequences.

This diagnosis leads the authors to call for a cultural as well as a policy response. Parenthood and family life, they argue, should be presented in public dialogue in a more positive light, not merely as individual preferences, but as contributions to the common good. Public discourse, media and education should be more open about the consequences of persistently low fertility, from labour shortages and fragile pension systems to increased loneliness and weaker social networks. Families, the paper insists, provide a public good that deserves recognition.

The policy recommendations flow from this perspective. Beyond financial supports, the authors emphasise the importance of earlier family formation, more secure and predictable working conditions, and greater stability in housing, so that young adults can plan their lives with confidence rather than uncertainty. They also stress the need for employment, education and housing systems that do not penalise people for having children sooner rather than later. Finally, the report proposes including topics such as family life, parenthood and fertility alongside financial literacy in secondary school curricula.

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the political foundation associated with the European People’s Party, the largest political bloc in Europe, consisting of Christian Democratic and once Christian Democratic parties (like Fine Gael). Its report is a reminder that Europe’s demographic future is neither inevitable nor irreversible, but the time available to shape it is steadily running out. 

Finally an official report rings the alarm bell about falling births

 

A new report from the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) warns that Ireland is sleepwalking into a demographic crisis. For the first time, that warning is coming from an important State-funded body.

NESC is an independent advisory body that provides long-term economic, social and environmental policy advice to the Irish Government and the Taoiseach. In its report Building a Virtuous Demographic Cycle, NESC argues that Ireland has already passed “peak baby” and “peak child”. Ireland is experiencing slow but profound changes in its population: fewer babies are being born, and the share of children in the overall population is now beginning to fall.

Birth rates have been declining for years and are now well below replacement. Without careful planning, these shifts will place increasing pressure on public services, social supports and public finances in the decades ahead.

NESC sets out two possible futures. One is a “vicious cycle” in which short-term pressures on housing, services and infrastructure lead policymakers to slow population growth. That would further depress fertility, increase emigration by Irish people, reduce the number of workers and place heavier burdens on public finances, creating a downward spiral that is difficult to reverse.

The alternative is a “virtuous cycle” that treats demographic change as an opportunity, the paper argues. This would mean aligning investment in infrastructure and services with higher population projections, signalling confidence in the future, and building capacity to meet people’s needs. A more balanced age structure and higher participation in the workforce would improve fiscal sustainability, support quality of life and strengthen social cohesion.

To achieve this, the report recommends coordinated action across six areas: long-term fiscal preparation; strategic support for families; proactive migration and integration policies; higher labour force participation; healthcare reform with an emphasis on healthy ageing; and balanced regional development.

Under the “strategic support for families” heading, the report calls for affordable childcare and housing, adequate parental leave, and income and welfare policies that reduce the financial and practical risks of having children.

Notably absent from the report, however, is any mention of the impact of around 10,000 abortions per year on Ireland’s declining birth rate, a silence that is difficult to justify in a report that claims to confront demographic reality of Ireland.

NESC stresses that Ireland has only a short window in which to act.

The report also notes the lack of demographers in Ireland. How are we supposed to study this problem properly if we lack the expertise?

The Resolution Foundation’s New Year Outlook 2026 report reaches a similar conclusion to the NESC report for the UK from a different angle. It suggests that 2026 may be the first year in which deaths exceed births, meaning that natural population growth disappears altogether. With fertility at record lows, future population growth will depend largely on net migration.

Immigration, the report suggests, will become ever more central to sustaining the UK’s population and economy, even as it remains politically contentious as simply bringing in more people does not solve a collapsing birth rate. Large inflows of low-skilled migrants may ease short-term labour shortages, but they do not reverse demographic decline and can become a long-term fiscal burden if they are not able to become sustained net contributors. Demographic renewal cannot be imported; it has to be rebuilt at home.

Deaths outnumbered births among Irish people in Q1 2025

 

In Ireland, the number of births continues to exceed deaths, but only thanks to the contribution of immigrant communities. In the first quarter of 2025, for the first time on record, more Irish nationals died than were born, a watershed moment. The overall fertility rate for the country is now 1.5, well below the replacement level of 2.1 children per couple.

According to the latest Vital Statistics from the Central Statistics Office (CSO), 13,665 births were registered in the first three months of 2025. This continues the downward trend of recent years: ten years earlier, in Q1 2015, there had been 17,183 births, even though the overall population was smaller.

In the first three months of 2025, there were 10,230 deaths, leaving a modest natural increase overall.  In other words, there were more births than deaths. There are always more deaths in the winter months, for obvious reasons.

However, when broken down by ethnicity and nationality, the picture becomes more complex.

The CSO publishes data on the nationality of the mother, rather than her country of birth. Some Irish-national mothers would been born abroad but later gained citizenship. Even so, the number of births to Irish mothers (whether born here or overseas) has been falling sharply. Compared with Q1 2022, births to Irish citizens were down by 2,858, a drop of 23pc. In proportional terms, Irish citizens accounted for 77.5pc of births in Q1 2021, but only 70.6pc in Q1 2025.

By contrast, births to non-Irish mothers have risen. The sharpest increase is among those from outside Europe, where births have more than doubled (+115pc) since 2021. In Q1 2025, non-Irish mothers accounted for about 4,000 births, or nearly 30pc of the total.

The new figures from the CSO also show that 39.9pc of births in Q1 2025 were outside marriage, with the figure higher among Irish mothers (45.5pc).

More than 80pc of births to mothers born outside of Europe were within marriage. This is because Indians, Nigerians, Filipinos and so are still far more attached to traditional values than are Irish-born people.

The average age of mothers has also been rising. In Q1 2025 it was 33.2 years, compared with 32.5 years ten years earlier. Irish mothers were slightly older, at 33.4 years.

There were 10,230 registered deaths in Ireland in Q1 2025, 7pc more when compared with the same period in 2024. The overall births (13,665) exceeded deaths by 3,435. This means that the population is growing, without considering immigration and emigration. But it is a small natural increase, about 60pc smaller than ten years ago.

With regard to deaths, while the CSO did not publish an ethnic breakdown for Q1 2025, we can rely on provided data for 2017–2022.

Using those proportions as a guide, it can be estimated that around 95pc of deaths were among ‘White Irish’ (the CSO’s term), equivalent to roughly 9,719 deaths. This figure is slightly higher than the number of births to Irish mothers in the same quarter (about 9,647).

One quarter’s data is not enough to draw firm conclusions, and it is better to wait for the full-year figures. Nevertheless, the trend can be expected to go further in this direction over time.

Overall, while the Irish-national population is edging towards decline, non-Irish births are sustaining population growth. The demographic balance is shifting, and children of migrant backgrounds now make up a rising share of Ireland’s future generations, a change that will become increasingly visible in schools and communities in the decade ahead.

Deaths outnumbered births by 1.26m in the EU last year

 

Fresh figures from Eurostat, the European Union’s statistics office, show the scale of Europe’s demographic challenge. In 2024, there were about 4.82 million deaths across the EU but only 3.56 million births, a deficit of almost 1.3m. In other words, when you compare births with deaths alone, Europe’s population is shrinking.

So why is the EU’s population still increasing? The answer is immigration. The EU’s total population grew by around 1.1 million people last year. This was entirely thanks to newcomers arriving from outside the Union.

This is what statisticians call “net migration”: the difference between the number of people moving into the EU and the number leaving it. In 2024, there were about 2.3 million more people arriving than departing, and this more than made up for the shortfall of births.

By contrast, since 2012, “natural change” (births minus deaths) has been negative every single year, meaning deaths have always outnumbered births since then. Immigration is now the only reason why the EU population is still growing at all.

Ireland’s position in these statistics is striking. In 2024, it had one of the fastest-growing populations in the EU, increasing by 16.3 people per 1,000 residents. Only Malta grew faster (19.0 per 1,000), while Luxembourg came third (14.7). But Malta and Luxembourg both have populations below 1 million people.

Most of Ireland’s growth came from immigration. Its net migration rate was 12.8 per 1,000 people, far above the EU average.

But unlike most EU countries, Ireland also saw a “natural increase” in its population of just under 19,000. In fact, Ireland recorded the highest natural increase in the EU, showing the largest positive gap between births and deaths, relative to its population. But the Irish figure is still half what it was 10 years ago.

The reason for Ireland’s relative high rate of natural increase is because it has a younger population than most of Europe.  For decades, Ireland also had a higher fertility rate (average number of children per woman) than most EU countries. Even though Ireland’s fertility rate has declined in recent years (from about 2.0 in 2002 to 1.5 in 2023), it is still above the EU average (1.38 in 2023).

But because today’s Irish fertility rate is also below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, this natural increase cannot last indefinitely. The youthful age profile that Ireland still enjoys is a temporary demographic advantage that it is gradually fading. Unless fertility rises meaningfully, Ireland will face the same pattern seen across the rest of Europe, just a little later.

In fact, the CSO has predicted that in about 20 years deaths will outnumber births here also.

Altogether, only six EU countries (Ireland, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden) had a natural population increase last year. Everywhere else, deaths outweighed births.

It is also worth noting that every EU country except Latvia gained people through immigration in 2024. But even in this picture, Ireland stands out for how much it relies on immigration to fuel its population growth.

Eurostat also tracks family trends. Across the EU, the marriage rate (number of marriages per 1,000 people) now stands at about 4.0. This is much lower than in past decades, reflecting a long-term decline.

Ireland’s figure is below the EU average, at 3.7 marriages per 1,000 adults, its lowest ever figure.

Therefore, both marriage and birth rates are declining together.

Ireland’s terrible combination: more abortions and fewer births

Since the 2018 referendum repealing the Eighth Amendment, the number of abortions in Ireland has continued to rise.  According to the annual report produced by the Department of Health recently the number rose to 10,852 in 2024 compared with 6,666 in 2019. This represents a 63pc increase.

Additionally, 201 Irish residents had abortions in England, based on the most recent UK statistics (referring to 2022), and 10 Irish residents had abortions in the Netherlands (in 2023).

The upward trend is clear. Abortion has become more socially accepted, and the legal framework introduced after the referendum has significantly increased requests.

One measurable outcome of this shift is the abortion ratio, i.e. the number of abortions compared to births. In 2024, there were 201 abortions for every 1,000 live births, meaning approximately 16.8pc of known pregnancies (excluding miscarriages and stillbirths) ended in abortion. To put this in context, let’s consider the figures from when abortion was legal in Ireland only to save the life of the mother.

In 2018, 2,879 Irish women had abortions in England, equivalent to 47 abortions per 1,000 live births, or 4.5pc of know pregnancies.

Pro-choice campaigners told the Oireachtas Committee on abortion in 2017 that around 5,000 Irish women were having abortions annually at that time, between women travelling to England, and women buying the abortion pill illegally. This would be an upper estimate of the total number.

This upper estimate means that at most there were about 82 abortions per 1,000 live births in 2018.

This means that since the repeal of the Eighth Amendment, the proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion increased hugely from 7.6pc (taking the pro-choice claim at face value) to 16.8pc. This sharp increase is one of the most striking consequences of the 2018 referendum.

Setting aside for a moment all moral considerations, let’s see how the growing number of abortions has an impact on the future population.

The current fertility rate in Ireland is just 1.5 children per woman, well below the replacement level of 2.1. At this rate, assuming no emigration or immigration, Ireland’s population would decline to around 3.05 million in 50 years-time from 5.3 today. Of course, there will surely be lots of net immigration, but we can still see what a low birth rate can do.

Fertility rates reflect only live births because they are calculated as the average number of children a woman would have in a lifetime, but if abortions are included in the calculation, the adjusted fertility rate for Ireland in 2024 would raise to approximately 1.78.

This is still below the replacement level, but significantly higher than the current rate.

A 1.78 rate means that, assuming no emigration or immigration, Ireland’s population would decline to around 4.04 million in 2075, a much smaller drop.

What is more concerning is that as the abortion rate is increasing, the impact on the future population is likely to be even more dramatic.

The figures outlined above make it clear that the abortion referendum in 2018 has brought about not only a legal and cultural shift, but also a significant demographic one. The significant rise of the abortion ratio within less than a decade is a measurable and consequential outcome. The broader societal implications, particularly in terms of declining fertility and long-term population reduction, should not be overlooked.

How social media could be reducing birth rates

 

Fertility rates are plunging around the world and have dropped in many cases to less than the replacement level of 2.1 children per couple. The finger of blame (so to speak) has been pointed in many directions, not least the cost of living and changes in values. But a new piece of research reckons part of the explanation is the amount of time we now spend on social media.

The research comes from Anna Rotkirch, Professor at the Population Research Institute of Helsinki.

Finland is known for its generous family policies and strong welfare systems, which should push up the number of children people are having. But Prof Rotkirch and her colleagues first noticed something odd around 2015. While most young adults still said they ideally wanted children, the proportion of those who didn’t want any had tripled, rising from 5pc in the previous decades to 15pc. Surprisingly, the reasons were not mainly financial. Instead, many cited personal lifestyle choices. Statements like “I want to do other interesting things in life” or “I don’t think I’m suitable for parenthood” became increasingly common, especially among women who were highly work-oriented and heavy users of social media.

A new distinct category, separated from traditional obstacles such as job insecurity or lack of housing, emerged among those who were delaying or avoiding parenthood. Research by Prof Rotkirch revealed a clear link between heavy social media use and uncertainty about having children. Those who spent less time online tended to express more stable intentions around family life, felt less work pressure, and were in more settled life situations.

The emotional influence of digital content may go further than we think, Prof Rotkirch suggests. Psychological experiments have shown that viewing simple, positive images of parents with children can increase the desire to have kids. On the other hand, online platforms like TikTok often amplify negative portrayals of parenthood, with viral content listing dramatic or even absurd reasons to avoid having children. Such content can easily change young adults’ perceptions.

There is growing concern about the broader mental health impact of smartphones, particularly among under-30s. Psychologists like Jonathan Haidt point to rising levels of depression, anxiety, and self-harm, especially among girls and young women, who are more vulnerable to social comparison. Young men, meanwhile, are more likely to retreat into digital worlds of gaming and pornography. These patterns, combined with increased loneliness and psychological distress, contribute directly to falling fertility rates.

Relationships are changing as well. Across many countries, people are dating less, having less sex, and forming fewer long-term partnerships. Even when couples do form, screen time often interferes with their time spent together. Research shows that screen use can harm relationship stability and in turn, the decision to have children, Prof Rotkirch claims.

As family formation is pushed later in life, due to career priorities, health concerns, or lack of emotional readiness, many simply run out of time. Moreover, marriage rates are also declining.

Why does this matter? Data show that the majority of births happen within long-term, stable unions. If fewer such unions form, and if they form later and break more easily, fewer children will be born. Delaying relationships and family life not only reduces fertility but may also feed into a wider cycle of isolation and relationship instability.

“It is possible to reverse these negative trends and promote screen-life balance—provided governments have the guts to tackle the gigantic technological and commercial interests involved”, Prof Rotkirch believes.

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Image by Pexels from Pixabay

How stable families build more prosperous societies

 

If we want prosperity, one important step is supporting and rebuilding the family. This is the central argument presented by the economist Philip Pilkington in his new booklet “Family Matters: Why Our Choices Determine Our Economic Prosperity”, which is published by the Alliance for Responsible Citizenship (ARC).

The study connects economic growth, and demographic trends to the strength of family structures.

The modern economy often focuses on productivity and investment, but family stability is frequently overlooked as a crucial factor, Pilkington maintains.

Without strong families, societies face declining birth rates, lower labour force participation, and rising welfare costs, all of which hinder long-term prosperity.

Looking ahead, Pilkington warns that declining fertility rates could lead to economic contraction, similar to Japan’s experience. He links issues such as low birth rates, mental health challenges, substance abuse, and crime to family breakdown, suggesting that strengthening family structures could be a key to reversing these trends.

One of the most striking points in Pilkington’s publication is that marital fertility – the number of children born to married couples – is significantly higher than non-marital fertility. Marriage provides both emotional and financial security which makes couples more willing to have more children.

This is crucial because a stable birth rate is essential for sustaining a productive workforce and preventing economic stagnation. Societies that see a decline in marriage also tend to experience overall population decline, something highlighted in a new Iona Institute paper.

In those countries, policies often focus on boosting fertility rates through financial incentives, such as child benefits and tax breaks. However, Pilkington argues that the real issue is not just birth rates but family formation. Simply encouraging people to have more children without strengthening family structures is short-sighted.

Children born into stable, two-parent households generally experience better outcomes in education, health, and future employment. In contrast, births outside marriage often correlate with lower stability, higher poverty rates, and increased reliance on State support. If governments want higher birth rates, they should prioritise policies that encourage marriage and family stability rather than just providing direct financial incentives.

When families break up, the State must step in, but this comes at a significant financial cost to the tax-payer, and the families themselves.

By shifting the focus from individual fertility to family stability and formation, policymakers can create conditions that naturally lead to higher birth rates and a more sustainable economic future.

The consequences of family breakdown extend beyond economics and welfare costs. Pilkington highlights social problems like crime, addiction, and mental illness that are often linked to unstable family environments.

One particularly telling statistic from the British government says that 24pc of adult prisoners had been in the care system at some point of their childhood.

Pilkington’s research makes one thing clear: economic prosperity and social stability are deeply intertwined with family structures. Countries that neglect the importance of marriage and family will face declining birth rates, rising welfare costs, and growing social problems.

The demographic crisis and what to do about it

 

Social attitudes towards the family and children need to be reshaped if we want to address sharply declining birth rates and the increasing phenomenon of unplanned childlessness, a major new report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) says.

States need to promote policies that promote family formation, the report says while also emphasising the positive role of religion on fertility rates, which is something a new research paper from The Iona Institute addresses.

The report titled “Demographic Change in the OSCE Region: Analysis, Impact and Possible Solutions of a Mega Trend Reshaping Society” was presented last week when the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE met in Vienna.

Authored by Dr. Gudrun Kugler, who is the Special Representative on Demographic Change and Security, the report addresses the pressing issue of demographic shifts among the 57 state members of the OSCE.

In almost all OSCE countries, including Ireland, fertility rates are below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, leading to long-term economic and social challenges, particularly for pension systems and healthcare infrastructure.

Migration partially offsets population decline but, according to the report, “governments should avoid relying on mass migration as the primary solution to labour shortages, as this can contribute to brain drain, destabilization in countries of origin, integration challenges, and the emergence of new inequalities and social tensions in recipient societies”.

The document notes that in countries such as India, Bangladesh, and much of East and Southeast Asia, birth rates are already below replacement. Africa is going in the same direction even if fertility rates in sub-Saharan Africa remain well above replacement level for now.

Declining birth rates around the world means that the supply of potential migrants will decline soon and eventually, countries will run out of potential immigrants to sustain their aging economies. This is why a recent Guardian report  projecting high immigration into Europe as a way of addressing population ageing and decline is overoptimistic. It is extremely unlikely that immigration into Europe will remain as high as it is now for another 75 years until the end of the century.

The document proposes a series of solutions, notably emphasising the pivotal roles of family and religion in counteracting declining birth rates and unplanned childlessness.

The first recommendation is for the establishment of dedicated research centres and the allocation of resources to study demographic trends. “Which personal choices might be more likely to lead to childlessness should be researched and be part of educational curricula”, the document suggests. This foundational knowledge is deemed essential for formulating effective policies and interventions.

The second set of recommendations regards cultural and societal shifts. “A broad cultural transformation is needed to create an environment that supports family formation and its stability over time, child rearing, and work-life balance. This includes fostering positive attitudes towards parenthood, marriage, and family life, emphasizing the value of stability in family structures”, the report remarks, “Public perceptions and social policies should avoid stigmatizing stay-at-home parents and should work towards increasing the social prestige of having children, family life and parental involvement.”

The report also advocates for financial incentives for families, including direct tax benefits, pension bonuses for parents, and reductions in the costs of child-rearing.

Finally, the OCSE document highlights the significant influence of religious communities in promoting family values.

“Religion plays a significant role in family values, and research shows that people with faith adherences tend to have higher birth rates. A balanced approach that respects religious beliefs and supports family life can help create a more inclusive society. Governments must recognize the positive impact that religious institutions can have on family stability and uphold freedom of religion.”, the report says.

Beyond addressing fertility issues, the document acknowledges the challenge of an ageing population and promotes policies that encourage older individuals to remain active in the workforce and community, so that they are less dependent on the younger generations.

A major new report paints an alarming picture of demographic decline

Falling fertility rates are propelling the major economies toward a major reckoning, according to a new study by the McKinsey Global Institute, one of the world’s leading management consulting firms.

As the report, entitled “Dependency and Depopulation? Confronting the Consequences of a New Demographic Reality” confirms, a huge and growing portion of the global population now resides in countries where fertility rates have fallen well below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children per woman.

In Ireland, it is currently at 1.5. Only in sub-Saharan Africa are fertility rates still well above replacement level.

This trend indicates that, by the end of the century, several major economies could witness population reductions ranging from 20pc to 50pc. For instance, China’s population has been decreasing year on year, with a reduction of 1.4 million in 2024 alone, and in 2100 will have less than half of the current population. Like the rest of East Asia, China does not want mass immigration to help alleviate the problem. However, even if China were to try this approach, there are simply not enough people in the world who can come to China and balance out its population decline between now and the end of the century.

The big decline in fertility rates is creating a growing unbalance between generations.

With families shrinking in size almost everywhere, for the first time in history a sharply declining number of young people will have to support for a fast growing cohort of older people who are not working.

The report calls “first wave economies” those regions that are at the forefront of experiencing demographic shifts associated with declining fertility and ageing populations.

In  what it calls ‘Advanced Asia’ (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea), ‘Greater China’ (Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) and ‘Western Europe’, there were 6.8 working-age individuals for every person over 65 years in 1997. Today this ratio is 3.9 to 1 and by 2050 it will fall to just two working age people for every retiree.

These changes pose challenges for economies traditionally reliant on a robust working-age demographic to support economic growth and social welfare systems.

To counteract this growing imbalance between the workers and those who depend on them – the McKinsey report claims – these countries would need to amplify productivity growth by two to four times the current rates or encourage individuals to work an additional one to five hours weekly. Moreover, retirement systems may require adjustments, potentially directing up to 50pc of labour income to cover the increasing gap between the financial needs and the income of the elderly population.

In confronting the consequences of demographic change, societies enter uncharted waters, according to the report.

“Even if global fertility rates were to jump overnight to the replacement rate, it would take 20 years, give or take, for those additional babies to become adults and begin contributing to economic growth through work”, the report notes.

The bad news is that no country so far has been able to return to replacement levels after falling below. 

The report suggests that migration can play a role in addressing labour shortages but only for a short period of time because many developing countries, which currently supply a large share of migrants, are expected to experience their own demographic transitions, leading to reduced migration flows in the long term. 

In Europe last year, deaths outnumbered births by 1.2 million

 

New figures from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, confirm the growing demographic crisis facing Europe. Last year, deaths across the EU outnumbered births by almost 1.2m, and this is only going to get worse. Births have not outnumbered deaths since 2012.

This is a consequence of fertility rates being well below replacement level across the continent and in some cases for decades.

At the beginning of 2023, according to Eurostat, there were 448.8 million people living in the European Union. The only reason this is little different from 20 years ago is because of immigration.

The average number of births per 1,000 persons living in the EU has dropped from 10.6 in 2008 to 8.7 in 2022.

One way of analysing fertility trends is to look at how many babies are born to mothers aged 40 and older compared to all babies born in a year. It shows the degree to which people are delaying having children.

In Ireland in 2022, 11.2pc of all births in 2022 were to mothers aged 40 and over, the highest in Europe. This has soared from 3.4pc in 2002.

Across the EU, the figure was 6pc in 2022, meaning many women in Ireland are waiting a particularly long time to have children, for whatever reason.

The proportion of births to mothers aged at least 40 in the EU as a whole was 2.2pc in 2002.

In Ireland, the mean age of first-time mothers is the third highest in Europe, at 31.5 years. The EU average is 29.7 years.

Ireland used to have the highest fertility rate in the EU – 1.97 births per woman in 2002 – but now it has decreased significantly. The current value (1.56) is slightly higher than the European average (1.46) but way below what is needed to ensure a natural balance between births and deaths, which is 2.1 births per woman.

Among EU countries, France has currently the highest total fertility rate (1.79), followed by Romania (1.71) and Bulgaria (1.65). The lowest rates were found in Malta (1.08), Spain (1.16) and Italy (1.24).

While the population is growing, due to immigration and people are living longer, there are ever fewer young people.

In the last 20 years, the percentage of people aged 0 to 19 years of age across the EU declined from 22.6pc to 20.1pc. Over the same period, the share of persons aged 65 and over increased in all EU countries 16.2 to 21.3.

Over the past twenty years, the Irish population grew by a massive 32.9pc, from 3.7 million in 2003 to 5.27 million last year. Much of this is immigration-driven. To put this into perspective, the total population of the EU increased by only 4pc during the same period.

In Ireland, births still outnumber deaths, although the gap between the two has halved in the last ten years. In due course, given our low fertility rate, deaths will outnumber births as elsewhere.

The European demographic crisis, which is already here, will affect Ireland as well, even before ours hits us directly, simply because our fate is so tied to Europe’s in multiple ways. It is time we began to have a serious discussion in Ireland about this topic.

Future Ireland: few children, lots of retirees

Ireland’s population is getting older fast as fertility rates fall rapidly, with serious social consequences. The latest projections from the Central Statistics Office (CSO) highlight dramatic demographic transformations ahead.

These projections, covering the period from 2023 to 2057, provide insights into population growth, ageing trends, fertility rates, and migration patterns. They are based on three possible scenarios, depending on different proportions of immigration.

The most striking trend highlighted by the CSO data is the ageing population. The proportion of people aged 65 and over is set to rise hugely. In 2023, it represented 15pc of the overall population. By 2057, this age group is expected to constitute between 27.8 and 31.6 percent of the total, depending on the scenario used. This demographic shift is due to increased life expectancy, which is obviously something positive, and declining birth rates, which instead have serious negative social consequences.

To understand the significance of an ageing population, we need to consider the so-called “older dependency ratio.” This is a measure that compares the number of people aged 65 and over (typically retired) to the number of working-age people (aged 15-64). It indicates how many retirees there are for every 100 working-age individuals. A higher ratio means more retirees relying on fewer working individuals, which can impact economic and social systems.

According to the Central Statistics Office, Ireland’s older dependency ratio is rising dramatically. In 2022, there were approximately 23 retirees for every 100 working-age individuals. By 2057, this number is expected to increase significantly, with projections indicating that there will be about 56 retirees for every 100 working-age people in the worst-case scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the prediction is still worrying, as there will be 47 pensioners per 100 individuals of working age.

With more people over 65 and fewer workers, there will be growing pressure on public finances. Pensions and healthcare costs are likely to rise, necessitating higher taxes or reallocation of resources. An ageing population will require more healthcare services, long-term care, and support systems, straining existing healthcare infrastructure.

Even the highest level of immigration projected by the CSO would not be sufficient to invert this worrying trend. Ireland’s problem is due to low fertility rates, which have been on a declining trajectory for too long. By 2047, in all possible scenarios envisaged by the CSO expert group, there will be more deaths than births in Ireland.

The Total Fertility Rate is projected to decrease from 1.55 in 2023 to 1.3 by 2038, stabilising at this lower level thereafter. Ideally, it should be above 2 to ensure a balance between births and deaths.

This decline reflects broader European trends. In Ireland, the average age of first-time mothers has increased to 31.7 years in 2021, up from 26 years in 1985. Not only are couples having children at a later age and having fewer children, but the number of women of childbearing age is also falling and it will continue inevitably in that direction, according to the CSO figures.

The projections presented this week by the CSO are extremely worrying but, significantly, there has been no reaction in the political arena. It is no surprise then that we have reached a point of no return.

What Census 2022 tells us about religion in Ireland

The number of Catholics in Ireland has dropped, according to the results of Census 2022, but this change must be properly interpreted. While there has been a decline among the Catholic population, a lot of immigrants are religious, and the way the religion question was rephrased since the last Census has almost certainly had an impact on the results.

Although Ireland remains an overwhelmingly Catholic country (nominally at least), with 69pc of the population identifying as ‘Catholic’, there has been a big rise in the number of people who ticked the “no religion” box in the last Census, from 451,941 in 2016 to 736,210 in 2022, accounting for 14pc of the population.

Over a fifth of those who say they have ‘no religion’ are non-nationals, which is higher than the percentage in the overall population who are from overseas. 

Immigration explains these trends but the significant rise of “no religion” is due also to the changes in the religion question.

The Census 2016 question asked: “What is your religion?”. After a consultation, the question was changed to “What is your religion, if any?” and the first response offered was “no religion”, whereas in 2016 it was the last option.

During the consultation process, Professor Stephen Bullivant, on behalf of the Iona Institute, requested that the question remain in its original format to allow proper comparison census by census. He also suggested that a separate question measuring actual levels of religious practice be included as well. (The submission can be found here.)

At the following meeting of the Census Advisory Group, Atheist Ireland were lobbying hard for two separate questions: “Do you have a religion?” and “If yes, which...?”. Prof. Bullivant suggested keeping the 2016 question and including “if any”. This suggestion was accepted but the CSO also offered “no religion” as the first option, which is unusual because in polls, the “none of the above” option is generally presented at the end, not at the beginning.

This change makes the comparison with the past quite difficult.

For instance, in 2022 there was a significant drop of those who identify as atheists (-87.4pc) and agnostic (-42.4pc). Most likely, those are now recorded under the more general “no religion” answer. But “no religion” would also include people who might not belong to an organised denomination and still consider themselves spiritual or even believers.

An RTE poll, for instance, found that only about one third who said they don’t belong to a religion were agnostics or atheist. Many continued to believe, without belonging.

Since 2016, the number of Catholics in Ireland - including non-Irish citizens - has dropped 4.9pc, from 3,696,644 to 3,515,861. But the Catholic share of a fast-growing population has dropped further, from 78.3pc in 2016, to 69.8pc last year. This garnered a lot of headlines.

The number of Anglicans (which includes members of the Church of Ireland, Church of England, and Episcopalians) slightly increased (1.7pc) and much of this  growth was accounted for by immigration.

Membership of certain other Christian denominations fell by more than membership of the Catholic Church: Lutherans -25.5pc, Unitarians -14.8, Methodists -12.7pc.  Evangelicals experienced almost as big a drop as the Catholic Church at -7.7pc.

Buddhist were also down -3.3pc, while there was huge surge of the percentage of Jainist +160.4pc, Hindu +140.7pc, +Rastafari 78.1pc, Zoroastian +74.3pc. But they remain small in number.

It is interesting to note regional differences in the Census 2022 results. The highest percentage professing “no religion” is in Dún Laoghaire/Rathdown County Council (23.9pc), the lowest is in Monaghan (6.8pc).

The highest percentage of Catholics is in Mayo (79.6pc), while the lowest is in the Dublin City Council area where only 52.6pc identify as such. The centre of Dublin has a very high number of immigrants.

The highest percentage of Muslims is in South Dublin (3.3pc), whereas the lowest is in Wicklow (0.7pc).

Ireland’s religious landscape is indeed changing but it is not easy to compare results when the key question asked about religion has changed so much.

A surprising reason why fertility rates have fallen so much

 

Fertility rates are declining almost everywhere, and we are not recognising the dramatic consequences for future generations, a new documentary highlights. But the documentary comes up with a rarely recognised reason for what is taking place, namely that many women who want children find for various reasons that their wish is not fulfilled.

Over the past 70 years, there has been a global decline in fertility rates, with a total fall of 50pc. In most parts of the world, fertility rates are now well below the replacement level of 2.1 babies per woman. (Ireland’s fertility rate is about 1.6, from a peak of 3.9 births per woman in the early 1960s).

Data scientist and filmmaker Stephen J. Shaw has travelled to 24 countries and analysed millions of data points in order to understand global fertility rates and predict the future population of the Earth. The results, presented in his documentary, “Birthgap”, are alarming.

It is a common belief that there are too many people on this planet, but the truth is that there is a real risk that the overall population will collapse, with dramatic consequences. Shaw predicts a humanitarian crisis of lonely old people.

Even if the overall number of people is still growing, soon the trend will reverse, as it is already happening in many countries.

Seventy percent of countries worldwide are currently below the population tipping point. As the number of newborns continue to decline, there will be a greater responsibility for supporting a larger elderly population.

Significantly, Shaw shows that in 30 industrialised countries, the average family size in the mid-1980s was the same as today: 2.4 people. This being so, why have average fertility rates falling by so much? The answer is that far fewer people are becoming parents at all.

By way of illustration, he points out that Japan has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world at 1.34. In 1973, 6pc of Japanese mothers were having four or more children, but surprisingly this figure is exactly the same today. What has changed is the number of childless women. It was 6pc in 1973 and within four years it reached 30pc, causing a drastic drop in births.

The same can be seen in other countries with very low birth rates. In Italy, for instance, 40pc of women are now childless.

It is not that mothers are having fewer children, but instead, there are fewer mothers. So the real issue is childlessness, which is often not what childless women want, Shaw claims.

This trend can be attributed to many factors.

A meta-study by Dutch academic Prof. Renske Keizer, found that just 10pc of women without children are childless by choice, 10pc for medical reasons, and 80pc because of circumstances. The most common factor is that they cannot find a suitable relationship. Paradoxically, this happens more when they are more educated and have a good career, as the more professionally successful a woman is, the stronger her preference for successful men. The problem is that not enough of these men exist.

Another factor, Shaw says, is that the female ‘fertility window’ is often overestimated and having children is delayed, by choice or circumstances, until the chance is gone.

There is no simple solution to a complex problem and all attempts so far have only mitigated the trend that has become global. Only in parts of Africa are fertility rates still above the replacement level.

Given that more women want children than is the case, society needs to urgently find legitimate ways of meeting this wish.

The coming ‘depopulation bomb’

 

A moral transformation, rather than social policies, will stop the de-population bomb claims Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, an expert in demography, in a new interview called the ‘De-Population Bomb’.

For years we have been warned of the dangers of an increasing world population (the so-called ‘population bomb’), but what happens when it shrinks, instead? This is already happening in many Western countries, he points out. Ireland has a fast-ageing population. Only large-scale immigration will stop it shrinking in the years ahead.

The United States, for example, was at replacement level (2.1 children per couple) or slightly above up to 2008. This means that there were sufficient births to compensate deaths, without taking into consideration immigration. Since then, the number of births per woman has gone down, particularly during the Covid pandemic. Ireland fertility rate is now about 1.7.

“If current trends continue, the United States would be on a track to shrink 20 percent for each generation”, warns Eberstadt, who a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and author of several studies on demography.

The European Union, Russia and China are experiencing the same demographic decline. So is all of East Asia, lead by Japan.

In Ireland, as Budget 2023 was being unveiled last week, the Department of Finance said that to maintain the current levels of public service we need an additional €8 billion in public expenditure each year by 2030.

“An ageing population will involve significant fiscal costs simply to ‘stand-still’”, said a risk assessment document.

In simple words, we need more young people working for the rest, particularly for those who have retired. Ideally, the size of the younger generations should exceed older ones but our demographic trends are going in the opposite direction.

Dr Eberstadt claims that the US federal spending is becoming untenable. “Today’s consumption for seniors is being financed by the unborn”.

One solution is more immigration, he says, but, even without considering the morality of depriving poorer countries of their workforce, this population policy does not always succeed in its intended purposes. He comments on the European experience: “The work rates are lower for the foreign-born than for the native-born in most European countries, the educational qualifications of working-age Europeans are typically lower for the foreign-born, and “non-EU foreign-born” youth are far more likely to be neither employed nor in education or training. The EU’s assimilation problem also looks to be intergenerational: throughout Europe, children of non-EU immigrants are generally more likely than their parents — not less likely — to see themselves as victims of group discrimination.”

In other words, large sections of the immigrant populations of parts of Europe are experiencing alienation, which often drives crime rates, and then voter backlash, as we have seen recently in Sweden.

Assimilation works better in the United States, Eberstadt claims, but immigration cannot be the only population policy to maintain demographic sustainability.

Dr Eberstadt is sceptical about subsidies and tax relief for families. He claims that “incentives to boost birth rates are likely to be costly and to elicit only modest and perhaps fleeting demographic results”.

Referring to the Scandinavian experience, where birth rates are mostly high relative to the European average (but still below replacement level), he talks about the “Swedish roller coaster”, i.e. the birth rate goes up just after a new subsidy is introduced, but then it goes back further below where it was before. What has to be changed instead, he maintains, is the people’s desire about the size of their families. This has been previously pointed out in this Iona Institute blog.

The best indicator for fertility rates is how many children women want, but this does not depend on economic conditions. Richer people do not have more children. The most affluent and productive society that humanity has ever seen has also the lowest fertility rates.

“Children are not convenient. We have moved into a world in which convenience is prized and in which constraints on personal autonomy are increasingly viewed as onerous”.

What is needed instead is a change in values. The desire for larger families depends on the appreciation of family values.

Dr Eberstadt believes that an ageing and declining population will experience the opposite: pessimism, hesitance, dependence, self-indulgence, resentment, and division.

We can change the head count with immigration, but it will work only temporarily if immigrants embrace the same mentality that causes depopulation, he says. We need instead a moral transformation so that people are confident and brave enough to maintain a natural rate of replacement for society.