venerdì, marzo 29, 2019
giovedì, marzo 28, 2019
martedì, marzo 26, 2019
Our politicians’ blind spot about the natural ties and children
The Oireachtas Health Committee met recently for the last pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill that will regulate Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR). The hearings have confirmed that the Committee suffers from huge blind spots about some of pitfalls of AHR and the undermining in many cases of the rights of the resultant children.
Two representatives of LGBT Ireland, Dr. Lydia Bracken and Ms Paula Fagan, spoke at the meeting and asked to make the Bill even more radical with regard to IVF, surrogacy and gamete donation.
Last year, in our submission on the proposed legislation, we warned that it would permit gamete donation from non-blood related family members. This means that, for instance, a woman could seek donor sperm from say, a brother-in-law. He might appear to the child to be his or her uncle, when he would, in fact, be the father.
Ms Fagan in her testimony to the Committee confirmed that female same-sex couples are already using family members of the non-birth partner as sperm donors. So, for that matter, are opposite-sex couples.
According to the current legislation (Children and Family Relationships Act 2015) when the donor is known, he is the legal as well as the biological father and so it is quite difficult to transfer parental rights from him to the commissioning adults (also known as the ‘intended parents’).
For the same reason, the current legislation does not allow both men in a same-sex relationship to acquire legal relationship with a child, as the mother is known and is by default a legal parent.
LGBT Ireland is asking to change the proposed Bill, which is already very permissive, so that whichever of the couple who is not genetically related to the child can become their second legal mother or father, by default and without any other court order.
The members of the Health Committee have raised no objections to this recommendation.
But how is this in the interests of the child? The same question applies when opposite-sex couples and single individuals use third party gametes to have a child. The State in such cases will be legally sanctioning the deliberate separation of the child from one natural parent. The supposed rights of adults are given priority over the rights of the child.
In their submission, LGBT Ireland also asked for a recognition of international surrogacy. The proposed Bill would allow only non-commercial surrogacy in Ireland (albeit making a generous allowance for ‘expenses’), but it does not address the challenging question of what to do with those children who are conceived and gestated by a surrogate woman abroad, and often for a huge fee. Again, this is an issue for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples and single individuals.
Dr Lydia Bracken told the Committee: “The child has no control over the circumstances of conception and so should not be disadvantaged by virtue of the fact that he or she was conceived through surrogacy abroad. We argue that it is in the best interests of the child for his or her relationship with the intended parents to be legally recognised in Ireland following the international surrogacy arrangement.”
But we ask, once more, how can be in the best interest of the child to be made the subject of a commercial transaction and have the ties to both the birth mother and the biological mother deliberately cut? It is for these kinds of reasons that many countries ban all forms of surrogacy.
It true that children have no control over their conception, but their parents do. The State should not only ban certain practices within its jurisdiction but also discourage them abroad, as much as possible.
LGBT Ireland also requested legal parenthood for the second woman involved in so-called “reciprocal IVF”. This happens when one partner in a female couple provides an egg to the other partner who will gestate the pregnancy, so that they both have a biological link to the child. One is the genetic and the other is the gestational mother but, according to the current legislation, only the birth mother is recognised as the legal mother.
The fact that both women want a natural tie to the child is an implicit acknowledges that such ties matter. But if they matter, then why permit gamete donation and surrogacy in the first places?
Notably, the members of the Health Committee did not in any serious way probe any of the ethical issues involved in these practices. This is despite the fact that many Oireachtas members have previously, and rightly, reacted in horror when they have heard about past adoption practices and how it was made almost impossible for adopted children and their natural parents to find one another. The question arises: do our politicians believe the natural ties matter or not?
domenica, marzo 24, 2019
La maggioranza delle coppie che fanno nascere bimbi malati non lo rimpiange
Una condizione di disabilità diagnosticata in un feto è sempre devastante. Molti ritengono sia un motivo legittimo per abortire ma nuovi studi dimostrano che la stragrande maggioranza delle coppie che portano questi bambini alla nascita sono contenti di averlo fatto, e ne risultano anche dati più positivi per loro in termini di come si sentiranno successivamente.
Una recente ricerca, che ha coinvolto più di 400 genitori, ha dimostrato che oltre il 97% di loro non ha rimpianto di aver proseguito una gravidanza affetta da una patologia fetale. Ciò conferma studi precedenti. Le ricerche condotte presso il Centro medico della Duke University hanno rilevato che esiste un «beneficio psicologico per le donne nel continuare la gravidanza dopo la diagnosi prenatale di un difetto fetale letale». Lo studio ha coinvolto 158 madri e 109 padri. Ha scoperto che le donne che avevano abortito «avevano molte più probabilità di riferire sentimenti di disperazione, evasione e depressione rispetto alle donne che continuavano la gravidanza». Ciò potrebbe essere dovuto a diversi fattori. I ricercatori ipotizzano che la continuazione della gravidanza conceda più tempo alle donne per rielaborare la sofferenza e alla fine raggiungere l’accettazione della diagnosi. Inoltre, possono ricevere più sostegno da familiari e amici poiché la perdita del loro neonato è più visibile e accettabile.
Sintomi psichiatrici come lo stress post-traumatico, il dolore e la depressione sono comuni dopo una perdita di gravidanza dovuta ad anomalie fetali ma quasi tutte le donne che decidono di partorire, non si pentono della loro scelta. «Continuare la gravidanza consente maggiori opportunità di trovare un senso e creare memoria, come l’opportunità di stringere il bambino e prendersene cura, scattare fotografie, formare altri ricordi e magari partecipare alla ricerca, alla donazione di tessuti od organi, ognuno dei quali può contribuire positivamente al processo di elaborazione del lutto».
L’analisi ha mostrato che «colpa ed elusione sono state riscontrate più spesso in donne che l’hanno interrotta», mentre la continuazione della gravidanza è stata associata a un minore disagio psichiatrico. «La scelta attiva che l’interruzione comporta, sembra aumentare la probabilità che la colpa venga vissuta, anche nel caso di anomalie fetali letali».
Un altro studio qualitativo riguardante genitori che non hanno abortito i loro figli disabili, pubblicato sul Journal of Prenatal Psychological Health, afferma che «contrariamente alla comune reazione della società in cui ci si concentra su ciò che di sbagliato ha il bambino, questi genitori si sono concentrati su tutto ciò che è positivo dei loro bambini». L’articolo descrive come la loro esperienza genitoriale sia stata accelerata e compressa, sapendo che il tempo da trascorrere con il loro bambino sarebbe stato breve e imprevedibile. Alcune coppie hanno creato opportunità per loro, e le loro famiglie, di interagire con il bambino quando era ancora nell’utero, con l’aiuto di macchine a ultrasuoni. La maggior parte pianificò attentamente la nascita, i funerali e talvolta il battesimo del loro bambino.
Tutti i genitori «hanno espresso la sensazione di dover essere il più vicino possibile al loro bambino», sotto forma di intimità fisica e anche di godersi il tempo limitato ma prezioso con il proprio bimbo. Concentrare il loro amore sul momento presente e anche sulla memoria ha permesso loro di trovare un senso nella propria sofferenza.
Uno studio del Medical Center dell’Università di Rochester menziona il trattamento spesso insensibile da parte degli operatori sanitari. «I genitori erano spesso sorpresi che i medici non fossero in grado di capire i loro bisogni. Questo risultato è coerente con il lavoro precedente che mostra che alcuni medici mettono in dubbio la decisione dei genitori di continuare la gravidanza». Un altro studio ha rilevato che la maggior parte dei genetic counsellor, che offrono assistenza a famiglie affette da malattie genetiche, ha menzionato l’aborto come un’opzione (83%), ma solo il 37% ha discusso la continuazione della gravidanza e il 13% ha presentato l’adozione come alternativa all’aborto. Ciò conferma quel che spesso dicono le famiglie che hanno avuto esperienze simili, ossia che si sentono pressate ad abortire.
Lo studio della Duke University ha anche indagato sul sostegno psicosociale fornito dalle comunità religiose ai genitori in lutto. Hanno messo a confronto le persone coinvolte in attività religiose organizzate (Ora), come la partecipazione a celebrazioni in chiesa, con coloro che invece esprimevano la loro religiosità più individualmente, in attività come preghiere personali, meditazione, ecc. (Nessuna attività religiosa organizzata o Nora). Hanno scoperto che «mentre l’Ora e il Nora sono associati alla continuazione della gravidanza, solo l’Ora è stato associato a un [buon] risultato psicologico … Mentre le attività religiose organizzate (Ora) aumentavano, diminuiva il dolore riportato». I ricercatori ipotizzano che frequentare la chiesa o altri incontri sacri contribuisca a ridurre il dolore conseguente alla perdita della gravidanza, probabilmente grazie al sostegno fornito dalle comunità religiose.
Tutti questi studi dimostrano che anche se il loro bambino è condannato a morire, coloro che non scelgono l’aborto vivono esiti più positivi. Questi genitori trasformano la loro tragedia in un’occasione profonda e intima per incontrare, abbracciare e amare il loro bambino.
venerdì, marzo 22, 2019
Quando la realtà supera la fantasia
Tempo fa scrissi sull'idea di cambiare la propria età anagrafica per adeguarla all'età percepita, sulla falsariga di argomentazioni che si ascoltano spesso a favore del cambio legale del sesso. Si trattava di uno scherzo. L'età, come il sesso, è un dato oggettivo che non può essere modificato con la semplice alterazione di un documento.Ora scopro qualcuno ha pubblicato un articolo dal titolo "Moral case for legal age change" nel quale si sostengono idee simili, e non si tratta di uno scherzo.
La teoria “age”
L’età, come il sesso, è un concetto fluido ed una costruzione sociale. È bene distinguere l’età anagrafica, l’età soggettiva e l’età sociale. L’età anagrafica è il dato oggettivo, scientifico, che attesta il tempo passato da quando siamo nati. L’età soggettiva, che chiameremo con il termine inglese age, sta ad indicare l’età sentita dall’individuo. L’età sociale, invece, indica il modo in cui le diverse culture costruiscono il significato dell’appartenere ad una certa età; le aspettative, i diritti e i doveri legati all’essere giovani, adulti, vecchi, ecc.
C’è ancora molta strada da fare perchè la società superi la propria ossessione per l’età anagrafica e riconosca le persone secondo l’età nella quale si identificano. Tutti abbiamo conosciuto settantenni che si sentivano ventenni. Perchè costringerli a vivere secondo la loro età anagrafica? La biologia non è destino. Quel che conta nell’individuo è ciò che si sente e quando l’età soggettiva non corrisponde con quella anagrafica, questa ovviamente dev’essere ignorata.
L’età assegnata alla nascita dovrebbe essere corretta con quella che effettivamente sentiamo. Le medicina, che ormai non serve a prevenire o curare malattie ma ad affermare la propria volontà sul corpo, oggi ci aiuta con nuovi farmaci che permettono di rallentare o di accellerare l’invecchiamento. La chirurgia poi può farci apparire più giovani o vecchi, secondo la propria età soggettiva, secondo la propria identità age.
Sulla carta d’identità al posto della data di nascita, che attesta un dato oggettivo, dovremmo piuttosto avere la nostra età soggettiva, che rappresenta veramente quello che siamo, ossia che sentiamo. Un po’ come per il genere sessuale, che ormai si può cambiare a piacimento. E quanti sono ancora incerti riguardo la propria identità age, dovrebbero poter indicare uno spettro temporale invece che un dato certo e preciso. L’età fluida merita attenzione e riconoscimento istituzionale.
La teoria age non esiste, è solo un termine utilizzato dai suoi nemici. Esistono invece tanti uomini e donne che per secoli sono stati discriminati soltanto perché si sono trovati in un corpo sbagliato, solitamente più vecchio della propria età soggettiva (age).
Nelle scuole andrebbero promossi dei progetti mirati a distinguere i diversi significati dell’età. Bisogna imparare il rispetto, a cominciare dai bambini. A scuola si dovrebbero introdurre corsi appositamente dedicati durante i quali si sensibilizzeranno gli alunni all’identità age, distinguendola chiaramente da quella anagrafica. Si insegnerà loro, ad esempio, a vestirsi e atteggiarsi da adulti, così da imparare il rispetto per la diversità e prevenire la violenza contro gli anziani.
I bambini dovrebbero imparare a riconoscere e superare i pregiudizi legati all’età sociale. L’essere neonati, infanti, bambini, adolescenti, adulti, anziani è una costruzione sociale che cambia con le culture. È arbitraria e pertanto può essere cambiata a piacimento senza procurare alcun danno. Non c’è nessun motivo per cui un adulto non debba poter andare con un ciuccetto un bocca o in passeggino, se questo esprime la sua età soggettiva, la sua identità age. Anzi, la diversità deve essere celebrata e promossa, anche sui luoghi di lavoro. La agefobia invece va contrastata con ogni mezzo, anche attraverso un’apposita legislazione volta ad introdurre uno specifico reato di discriminazione legata all’età.
I bambini dovrebbero imparare a contravvenire le convenzioni sociali, che in fin dei conti sono solo pregiudizi, espressione di strutture di potere consolidate nel tempo. Per secoli i transage sono stati discriminati e ridicolizzati ma è ora di avviare un processo di accettazione e riscatto sociale. Bisogna porre fine alla sofferenza di chi non si identifica con la propria età. Ad esempio, se mi sento un infante dovrei avere diritto ad iscrivermi ad un asilo infantile e venire accudito, cambiato, imboccato, ecc. In Svezia da oltre venti anni esistono asili egualitari, come “Equalage”, aperti a persone di tutte le età. E se non siete convinti, tanto a voi cosa cambia?
Michele Marziano
Docente di Istituzioni di Devianza presso il Dipartimento di Ossimorica, Facoltà di Irrilevanza Comparata, Università di Parigi Félix Faure.
martedì, marzo 19, 2019
God and Reason
Review of Meister Eckhart: Philosopher of Christianity, by Kurt Flasch, Yale University Press, 344 pp, £25, ISBN: 978-0300204865
In traditional accounts of the history of philosophy, Meister Eckhart has usually been presented as a mystic. In opposition to more intellectual schools of the Middle Ages, he was often portrayed as the promoter of an anti-scholastic approach privileging religious experience or as the defender of negative theology, according to which the only meaningful discourse about God is about what He is not.
In this work, Kurt Flasch aims at rebutting what he believes to be misleading interpretations of Eckhart: “There is nothing authentic about the label ‘mystic’ in Eckhart’s case.” Flasch proposes instead to consider him a “philosopher of Christianity”, that is someone who explains Christian beliefs through pure reason.
Flasch devotes an entire chapter of his book to the explanation of what he claims to be a forgotten concept that has been abandoned by theologians and philosophers. A philosophy of Christianity is “an attempt to prove Christian ideas rationally in such a way that believers and unbelievers alike would come to recognize them as true, and not merely as culturally contingent constructs of Christian communities of faith”. He admits that our understanding of reason has not been the same everywhere. Purely rational proofs have changed through time and this approach has been rejected both by those who are Christian, because it would reduce faith to a series of philosophical tenets, and by those who aim to use a completely rational method, because this method would disprove Christian beliefs as illogical or untenable. Flasch instead suggests that this is precisely what Eckhart attempted to do with his works and, even without agreeing with the results, he presents a detailed account of his “philosophy of Christianity”. Before considering what Christianity is, the author discusses what philosophy should be: “the habit to justify one’s statements, to argue most precisely according to a set of common rules”.
The book is an invitation to read Meister Eckhart in his historical context. Eckhart thought of himself as a philosopher but perception of him changed throughout the centuries. He had immediate influence on some of his contemporaries, such as Henry Suso and Johannes Tuler. Nicholas of Cusa studied Eckhart when young but with time, due to the condemnation of the Church, his works became less available and only a distorted version of his thought survived. Nevertheless, he had a strong impact not only on philosophers such as Hegel, Martin Buber or Martin Heidegger but also on writers like Robert Musil and Paul Celan.
There are gaps in his chronology and therefore in our knowledge of him but recent discoveries and studies allow Flasch to present a convincing portrait. The name Meister indicates that he was a magister, a master at Paris in 1302, the highest rank attainable for any academic at the time. Like Albertus Magnus, whom he probably knew personally, and Thomas Aquinas, the most important philosopher of the Middle Ages, he was a member of the Dominican order. In 1303 he was elected provincial of Saxony and then vicar general of Thuringia and Bohemia.
Eckhart lived in turbulent times, both for the church and for the civil power. In his Divine Comedy Dante famously placed all the popes who had reigned in his lifetime in hell. Celestine V had abdicated, Boniface VIII was corrupt, John XII was in exile in Avignon and involved in endless controversies with the antipopes. Interestingly, Eckhart ignored the pope in his works, as both spiritual and political leader. Not only was the church divided; in the final decades of Eckhart’s life two German emperors were simultaneously elected. This was also a period of new intellectual developments. Aristotle’s influence in particular was growing among philosophers and theologians since the discovery and the translation into Latin of his texts, preserved by the Islamic civilisation. Meister Eckhart absorbed and reinterpreted the neo-Aristotelianism he had learned in Paris.
It is difficult to reconstruct the progression of Eckhart’s thought due to a lack of sources that can be dated with certainty. Even his date of birth can only be speculated to be before 1260, while we know that he died at the beginning of 1328. His works are of various kinds: he spoke or wrote for educated audiences, mostly in Latin, but also for lay people, in German. One of his models was Albertus Magnus, also a Dominican and a teacher, among others, of Thomas Aquinas. In his treatise On the Intellect and the Intelligible, Albertus taught that the object of our intellect is the universal, which exists in reality and is the foundation of individual things. Following Plato, he claimed that philosophy is the knowledge of one’s self. The intellect finds God and truth within itself, as it immanent principles. It is the link between God and the world. Albertus’s treatise, in Flasch’s interpretation, opened the way for Eckhart’s philosophy of Christianity.
There are conflicting opinions about Eckhart. In order to gain a better understanding Flasch presents and comments on a series of self-portraits supplied by him. It was a commonplace in academic commentaries that the author would explain his intention, expectations and assumptions to his readers. Those self-portraits can help us interpret Eckhart but they are only points of departure that have to be compared with the achievements of the author and checked with the text of the works. This is precisely what Flasch does in the rest of his work. He laments that previous readings of Eckhart often lack linguistic discipline, semantic specification and a philological basis. He presents a rigorous analysis based on a number of important developments in the study of Eckhart: a critical edition of his German sermons, a more comprehensive understanding of his cultural milieu thanks to our improved knowledge of medieval German philosophy and a recent discovery by the Italian medievalist Loris Sturlese of a manuscript in Oxford. Sturlese has proposed a revision of the chronology of Eckhart’s works in Latin and also edited his trial records, shedding new light on the last years of his life. In combining philosophical considerations with philological and historical methods a new portrait merges from Flasch’s book.
What concept does Eckhart have of reason? He doesn’t prove the existence of God from the order of nature. Reason finds God in itself. Reason is the location of God’s birth; it unites man and God. This metaphor of God’s birth expresses important elements of Eckhart’s philosophy and caused him troubles with his inquisitors. The soul forms itself according to its objects. “It has a greater unity with that which it seeks, knows, and loves than with its physical and psychological organism.” It becomes what it is after, it reshapes its character in consonance with what it longs for. It doesn’t stand fixed but becomes what it takes up, what it consistently places itself in relation to. Through seeing and loving, man becomes what he sees and loves in the mind. Likewise, someone who loves justice becomes justice. Eckhart uses the metaphor of birth to express the plasticity of the soul. The soul’s entering into justice is the birth of God within it. It has to be a birth that occurs unceasingly; it is the divine’s perpetually new activity. This is an unprecedented interpretation of some fundamental teachings of Christianity. The birth of the Son in the Godhead only interests us insofar as it happens within us. God births his son in us in the same fashion as he does in eternity. We don’t have to imitate Christ’s life and virtues in order to resemble him. We share with him an identical flow of life that everyone can recognise and find operating within himself. God is mind and his nature is self-disclosure; he must disclose himself. This is not a special feature of Christianity but, according to Eckhart, a philosophical truth that can be found in the traditional awareness of God as formulated by many pagan thinkers. The birth of God occurs within us as mind. Human beings obscure the ground of their soul, instead of looking for the truth within they scatter themselves in the external world and they lose their unity.
The thesis that the divine begetting of the logos in eternity is identical to the birthing of the Godhead in men raised a few problems for Eckhart as this view was clearly against the orthodox theology of the time. Another controversial thesis he defended is that becoming one happens in an unmediated form as nothing created steps in between the soul and God. Man becomes deified without any intermediaries. This opinion questioned the idea of grace, which according to Aquinas is created within the soul and given freely (gratis). If nothing created steps in between the soul and God what is the role of sacraments?
Eckhart’s approach to the Bible is also peculiar. He sets out to explain it with philosophical arguments and also wants to show that it contains all the principles and conclusions required for knowing nature. His commentaries are not philological. Rather he aims to demonstrate the main truths of the scriptures (the nature of God, the Trinity, the creation of the world and the incarnation etc) philosophically but also to prove that the insights of the ancient philosophy and its later developments, particularly the Aristotelian tradition both from the West and the Middle East, were in the Bible either explicitly present or implied. We only have to be able to locate them through philosophical arguments. All biblical interpretations have little value for those who have not already thought through its philosophical premises. For instance, in his commentaries on the book of Genesis Eckhart reads it as a work of natural history and he wants to prove that God, who is Truth, included all truth in his revelation. He doesn’t say that Genesis teaches the traditional three fields of knowledge, that is metaphysics, physics and ethics, but he maintains that the Bible suggests this and it is his task to make explicit its implicit teachings. He wants to prove them first on the grounds of reason and then find them in the scriptures. He wants to determine the philosophical truths contained in the text.
Flasch demolishes the idea that Eckhart was a mystic. He did not approach God through spirituality or through the natural world but through being. What is peculiar in his philosophy is that he rejects any examination of being in terms of its efficient and final cause. The philosopher doesn’t look for the origin or for the purpose of something. This would be appropriate for the investigation of the natural world but Eckhart is searching for the pure form as the true being. The divine life and the life of the deified man are disclosure of form outside efficient and final causes. When discussing the primary determinations of being, what the medieval called the transcendentals, Eckhart adds Idea, Wisdom and Love to the traditional Oneness, Truth, Goodness and Being (esse). The essential determination of God is intellect. He created everything within himself by contemplating ideas and he carries the world as the realm of ideas within himself. Flasch highlights the strong influence of neoplatonism on Eckhart, but also of Aristotle and Avicenna. Thomas Aquinas is often referred to but mostly as a philosophical antagonist. The Jewish Moses Maimonides, particularly his negative theology, was also a source of inspiration for Eckhart. In discussing God’s darkness as a surplus of light he quotes from Maimonides: “The intellect that approaches God butts against the wall” and he explains that there is no darkness in God but only light, too much light that blinds our intellect and makes us ignorant.
Eckhart broke with tradition in many respects. For instance he reinterprets monastic values, such as obedience for example, transforming them into a theory and practice of self-understanding. Obedience is radical self-abandonment, separation from ambitions, honours and possessions. We hinder ourselves when things hinder us. If I willingly surrender my will to God then the God within me will act for me. This is not self-punishment but rather the exchange of the I for the Godhead. Obedience is “letting the self be”, under the guidance of God who determines and perceives my interests. Thus, begin with yourself to let yourself be, recognise yourself as having the power to say no. According to Flasch, Eckhart encouraged his contemporaries to realise that it is they who attribute values to objects and situations; they create what matters to them. He encouraged them “to see through and reject every dependence on external things as a self-made shackle”. In this renunciation of reliance on things we experience the solitude of our interior, which is not loneliness but a practical understanding and active reassessment within our social context. Eckhart teaches that we must keep silent and let God speak and act. Man must leave everything be. Detachment is the entry point of life. The next step is insight into the presence of God in the soul, when man recognises the purity of God’s nature. This is not passivity but active withdrawal as inward action is needed. Obedience as “well-practiced detachment” does not require supernatural intervention, and this is why Eckhart relativised all monastic practices and exercises. Those who have achieved detachment will know how to act; they will know what to do because they flow with God. On the other hand, no ascetic exercises can substitute this state in those who have not achieved it yet, those who are not one with the One. Eckhart did not devalue monasticism and asceticism, but he considered them to be good only as long as they assisted the birth of God.
Meister Eckhart was aware of being an outsider. Two of his Dominican confreres reported him as a heretic to the archbishop of Cologne in 1325 or 1326 and the episcopal inquisition initiated the trial. The pope sent an official visitor, Eckhart was given a list of errors, wrote an apologia and was absolved, but his accusers presented more allegations. Eckhart recanted potential errors and lamented misunderstandings. As a Dominican he claimed to be beholden only to the pope and the University of Paris. The trial was moved to Avignon, where he had more rights and would have been examined by more expert theologians. These trial records are now accessible thanks to Sturlese’s recent critical.
In 1327 he was interrogated in person. The panel produced an extensive evaluation of Eckhart’s writings but at the beginning of 1328 he died. The trial continued despite his death. The pope issued his final judgement in March 1329 and condemned some of Eckhart’s teachings. He distinguished them according to their degree of reprehensibility. Of twenty-eight theses, fifteen were found heretical, eleven were suspected of being so and in the case of two more Eckhart denied he ever taught them and so they could not securely be attributed to him. Eckhart was dead and could not be condemned but his books were to be destroyed.
In his study Flasch demonstrates that Eckhart’s views, particularly the idea of the deified man, are incompatible with the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church. For instance he had conferred the traditional attributes of Christ onto man and claimed that he was not “made” but “begotten”. He transferred man as God’s son into the Trinity. Divine filiation, becoming sons of God, is a concept present in the scriptures and in the teachings of the Fathers but Eckhart did not maintain the fundamental difference between Creator and creature. In the orthodox version, well expressed by Aquinas, divine filiation consists of similarities between God and his sons, not substantial oneness. God is the cause of the life of the soul, but Eckhart had rejected efficient cause in his theology. He claimed that divine goodness does not make the good man but it begets him. There is no more distinction between God and the soul, no separation. This understanding of the deified man had consequences for Eckhart’s views on the Trinity, which were also denounced as heretical. If every man becomes God then Christ’s singularity is disregarded. Moreover, he claimed that in God there is no distinction of persons. Eckhart provided a robust defence of his views, defending the orthodoxy of some of them, rejecting misinterpretation of others, blaming his emphatic style of preaching for some excesses in his sermons and, on rare occasions, retracting them. Flasch emphasises that Eckhart’s formulations expressed a new philosophy of Christianity that inevitably deviates from and conflicts with tradition. “They saw him as being in opposition to all Christian theologians of the time, and in this they were right.” Flasch notes moreover that the inquisitors never accused Eckhart of having gone overboard with mysticism.
Even though not intended for a specialised audience, this book requires a substantial knowledge of classical and medieval Western philosophy to be enjoyed. The author is a distinguished scholar of the Middle Ages and his theses are throughout convincing and well argued. In the different chapters of the book he provides an acute analysis of all of Meister Eckhart’s works, both popular and academic, which inevitably implies repetitions. Flasch’s commentary is interspersed by engaging personal reflections on his historical method and on writing about Eckhart today. When he cannot present an adequate account of some of the works, he refers to his own studies on the subject. The notes at the end are detailed and useful but they contain passages from the Sermons not only in Latin but also in medieval German, which are hardly readable by anyone today.
Kurt Flasch has contributed to a reassessment of Eckhart as a philosopher rather than a mystic and this work represents a definitive word on the matter. His aim is also to give an account of a phase in the history of European thought. Whether Eckhart was orthodox or not, Flasch demonstrates that he has had an undeniable role in the history of Christian self-understanding.
lunedì, marzo 18, 2019
domenica, marzo 17, 2019
martedì, marzo 12, 2019
No strong evidence that free contraception will reduce abortion rate
Health Minister Simon Harris wants the State to provide free contraception as a way of reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies. Evidence from other countries suggests that his plan won’t work and may be another waste of public money that would be better spent elsewhere.
If we look at and compare abortion rates with easily available and sometimes free contraception in a variety of European countries we discover that there is no correlation between them.
The dark green countries in the graphic are highlighted by the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights for having general reimbursement schemes (including long-term contraception) for contraception-users, special contraception arrangements for young and vulnerable groups, plus Government-supported websites providing contraception information.
But two of the countries in that group – France and Britain – have high rates of abortion by European standards, while Italy, which scores poorly in the Forum’s analysis in terms of affordable contraceptive availability and information has a much lower abortion rate. The abortion rates are 6.2 per 1000 women age 15-49 in Italy, compared with 14.4 in France and 16.7 in the UK.
In a previous blog I have commented on two studies that found no correlation between the cost of contraceptives and the rates of abortion.
Since then an interesting new article has been published on the BMJ Open website, with the title “Ecological study on the use of hormonal contraception, abortion and births among teenagers in the Nordic countries.”
The study focuses on teenagers in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In the period 2008-2015 both birth and abortion rates decreased in those countries, particularly among teenagers. The study tested the hypothesis that “the increasing availability of contraceptives is one of the reasons for the decline” and found that this is not the case.
“The observed differences in overall user rates of hormonal contraceptives could not explain the differences in abortion rates since, for example, Norway had a lower user rate than Sweden, but still had lower abortion rates.”
There are three main factors determining the risk of unplanned pregnancies: the proportion of sexually active women, the proportion of women using a contraceptive method and the efficacy of this method.
The study said nothing conclusive about the first factor. (We know from other studies that in developed countries there has been a decline in the sexual activity among teenagers and a postponement of their first intercourse. This is due partly to the fact that they socialized more online rather than in real life.)
With regard to the proportion of contraceptive users, there were only small differences between the countries studied, and the proportion did not increase more in countries with the steepest decrease in births and abortion rates.
The study then highlights the high efficacy of so called long-acting reversible contraceptive (LARC) methods, such as implants, compared to pills or condoms, but “the impact on the overall and long-term abortion rate has been difficult to detect.”
Those three factors (sexual activity, use and quality of contraception) are influenced by cultural and social aspects. Interestingly, the study is quite sceptical about the efficacy of sex education programmes.
“It has been suggested that sexuality education programmes may lower teenage pregnancy rates by postponing the first sexual intercourse and by increasing both contraceptive user rates and quality of use. There is however a wide variety of programmes, and from the studies, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the extent to which programmes actually affect teenage pregnancy in practice. A Cochrane review of school-based sexuality education programmes found no evidence of an impact on pregnancy rates”.
We have discussed this issue here.
The study dismisses the claim that subsidies of contraceptives can lower pregnancy rates, which is what Minister Harris is suggesting.
“Denmark, without any subsidies at all, has a higher contraceptive user rate and a lower abortion rate than Sweden, which offers subsidies for young women. This is in keeping with the findings from an English study where staying at school rather than the promotion of long-acting reversible contraceptive (LARC) seemed to have a higher impact on the teenage pregnancy rate.”
Thus, there is little or no evidence that free contraception will reduce the number of crisis pregnancies. Such a programme would cost anything up to €126 million per annum according to a report in Times Ireland. Wouldn’t that money be far better spent on the new children’s hospital?
Labels:
abortion,
contraception,
Iona Institute,
Ireland
domenica, marzo 10, 2019
Refusing to see the evidence about children of married parents
Yet another study was published recently showing that “children born to unmarried parents are disadvantaged relative to children born to married parents in terms of parental capabilities and family stability”. The study follows the lives of 5,000 children born between 1998 and 2000 in large US cities. It is called the ‘Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study’. It is overseen by Princeton University’s Professor Sarah McLanahan. She was interviewed about the study recently on the BBC. What is fascinating is the interviewer’s obvious resistance to the findings of the research.
Professor McLanahan, who raised a child on her own for ten years, first of all outlines some of the main conclusions of the study.
She says of the ‘fragile families’ followed by her research team: “The bottom line is that there is an enormous amount of instability, partnership changes, so a lot of them, mothers who do start out cohabiting with the father, most of those relationships end by the time the children are five-nine years old and then the mother goes on to look and have another partner that she may live with, and she may have a child with that second partner. And then that relationship may you end. And so, the children in these families are exposed to a lot of changes in the partnership composition of the household. They also end up with many half-siblings.”
The interviewer then asks: “When you looked at the children’s education, their emotional well-being, their behavior, how did it look for the children?”
Professor McLanahan responds: “It looked worse in every dimension and some of that is due to the fact that these children have less educated parents, they have lower incomes and all of those things but even after you take those factors into account, there’s an additional a negative consequence associated with the partnership changing. So, the children they do worse on cognitive tests. They do worse in behavior, especially social emotional behaviour problems, and there’s also more asthma, worse sleep patterns and lots of just health problems as compared to children raised in stable two parent families.”
It is now that the interviewer begins to resist the findings and discover if there is some way to explain them away and conclude that they have nothing to do with the children having two parents per se, or with being married.
She asks Professor McLanahan “how she could be so sure that these results are due to the parent’s marital status and not other differences.”
Professor McLanahan responds: “But you can do that statistically by comparing parents who have the same amount of instabilities but one also had the instability of partnership and the other family has not.”
The interviewer presses on: “And is the effect of being unmarried really worse than some of the other effects that we’re talking about?”
Professor McLanahan cuts to the heart of the interviewer’s concern: “I think what you’re asking is: what if you were unmarried, a stable single mother, who has lived in the same house and never had a partner. There are a few of these mothers and the research does show their children do worse. And if you think about it, why do they do worse? They have one parent time instead of two.”
The interviewer still doesn’t let up: “Were these results consistent enough for you to be absolutely sure that you were saying, an effect that was linked to the to the family setup?”
Professor McLanahan (remember, she lived for 10 years as a lone parent and therefore sympathises greatly with lone parents) sticks to her guns. She says: “Yes, yes, I think so. A parent’s time and money is what parents have to invest in their children so when you only have one parent you’re going to have less time and money, even though as many as about a third of the unmarried fathers do stay involved with their children, even after they’ve ended the relationship with her mother. But they don’t stay nearly as involved as the married fathers and one of the things that’s interesting about this, or sad I guess you could say, is that during the last twenty years there’s been a large increase in fathers’ involvement with children and so the during the period when the more highly educated fathers are spending more time with their children, the less than college educated fathers are spending much less, primarily because they’re not living with their children. What worries me the most is I see this as really contributing to a growing gap between the children born to educated parents and the children born to less educated parents. So, it’s increasing inequality”.
Even now, the interviewer won’t let go. She still wants to be absolutely sure that the study really finds that family structure makes a difference to children.
Now she states: “Your study includes thousands of families but given the complexity of families and of day-to-day living, how can you be sure that the families you studied give you a reliable enough findings to make these conclusions?”
Professor McLanahan (a very patient women evidently) responds: “We can’t run an experiment where we had kids who are exactly alike, we assign one living to a fragile family or being born to a fragile family, and one being born to a stable to parent family. So, we can never rule out that some of the factors that are affecting those choices are responsible for the poor child outcomes. But we have lots of econometric and statistical approaches for dealing with these issues and my sense, at the end of the day, is that there is a causal effect in these family changes on child wellbeing. I don’t think it’s gigantic, it’s not as big as the effect of mothers’ education, but it’s big enough to be a concern, it’s big enough to increase inequality.”
What is going on here is very interesting. When studies are published showing the poverty can have ill effects on children, no-one asks the researchers if they can be absolutely, 100 percent sure that they are really measuring the effects of poverty and not other factors (e.g. family instability!).
Studies have been produced of children raised by same-sex parents saying the children are doing just fine, and they are barely questioned, even though the sample sizes are almost always tiny and/or non-random.
But here we see huge resistance to the findings of another big, longitudinal study which indicates that family structure makes a difference to the lives of children, even after controlling for other factors.
Finally, having explored every other avenue, the interviewer pointblank asks: “Do you worry that your findings are open to being hijacked by people who might want to draw quite different conclusions about how, particularly women, should lead their lives?”
Professor McLanahan answers: “Definitely yes. There are people who would like to say, you know if we just get everybody married everything will be ok, and you know, I definitely don’t think that would fix things at all. I think we have to fix a lot of this societal conditions that are making it so hard for these parents to have a stable relationship.
But who is really saying this? Who really thinks that getting married is a cure-all? But it clearly helps in some cases, as the Fragile Families study indicates. Why can’t we say this? Perhaps it is ideological resistance to saying marriage matters that is the real problem here, or ideological resistance to saying fathers matter?
Few people say mothers don’t matter and surely it is simply common sense to suggest that having the father around is of benefit both to the mother and the children, assuming he is a fit parent?
Maybe one day we can accept studies like this one at face value, draw the necessary policy conclusions and do what we can to connect more fathers to their children and the mothers of their children. That something used to be marriage.
sabato, marzo 09, 2019
Dialogo
«“Dialogo”, la parola che (…) dovrebbe essere la chiave di volta di ogni cristianesimo presente e futuro, non è ebraica ma greca, ed è del tutto sconosciuta alla Scrittura, sia nell’Antico che nel Nuovo Testamento. Quest’ultimo usa invece per dieci volte il verbo apologheomai e otto volte la parola apologhia, nel senso di “difendersi” e di “difesa” a viso aperto nei confronti degli avversari del kerygma, l’annuncio che “Gesù è il Signore”. Nessuna rilettura aggiornata del Nuovo Testamento può togliergli un aspetto che è evidente in ogni sua parte: il cristianesimo, cioè, vi appare come “scontro” almeno quanto “incontro”. A cominciare da Cristo stesso, che mette in guardia da letture paciose del suo messaggio: esso sarà causa di divisione persino all’interno delle famiglie; egli, Gesù, non è venuto a portare la pace, ma la guerra. Dall’inizio alla fine il Vangelo risuona di grida: “razza di vipere!”, “sepolcri imbiancati!”, “guai a voi!” sono soltanto alcune delle espressioni che il Cristo riserva ai suoi antagonisti. I quali sono praticamente tutti i gruppi dell’ebraismo a lui contemporaneo, aggiungendovi anche il potere romano, per una sentenza del quale sarà alla fine condannato a morte. Da Betlemme al Golgota, Gesù è sempre circondato di avversari, che affronta e chiama con il loro nome».
(Vittorio Messori, La sfida della fede, 1993, p. 127)
(Vittorio Messori, La sfida della fede, 1993, p. 127)
venerdì, marzo 08, 2019
L’otto per la vita
di Costanza Miriano
Buona festa della donna alle mie ormai migliaia di amiche e conoscenti che se ne fregano della festa della donna, che non hanno rivendicazioni da fare, che sono felici di avere avuto la incredibile fortuna di poter essere al servizio della vita – sia che i figli non arrivino, sia che ne arrivino otto, nove, undici o dodici: quello che conta è la disponibilità – che amano farsi i fatti degli altri, prendersi cura, farsi carico, che vogliono essere alleate dei loro uomini, imparare a tradurre il loro linguaggio, stare dalla loro parte, aiutarli a essere migliori, mentre loro le proteggono.
Buona festa alle donne – tutte quelle che conosco – che non trovano assolutamente niente di strano nel volantino della Lega di Crotone: tutte noi pensiamo che l’utero in affitto sia una vergogna, che ci chiamiamo mamma e non genitore 2, che non siamo interessate alle quote rosa ma ad avere uno stile di lavoro diverso da quello degli uomini, che tenga conto del fatto che siamo più brave a prenderci cura delle persone piccole e deboli, siamo più brave e ci gratifica molto, buona festa a noi che pensiamo che prenderci cura della famiglia è per noi naturale, anche se vogliamo essere libere di poter dare un contributo a costruire un mondo migliore anche fuori (nessuno si sogna di pensare che le donne non debbano lavorare se lo vogliono), ma non con i tempi e lo stile dei maschi; a noi che, come dice il volantino dello “scandalo” (che a noi sembra semplice buon senso) ci sentiamo strumentalizzate da chi afferma di difenderci ma lotta solo per permetterci di abortire, mai per aiutarci a far nascere e tanto meno a crescere i nostri figli.
Questo è semplice buon senso, ed è davvero paradossale e francamente irritante che dire queste cose sia considerato “di destra”: a me per esempio la politica non interessa, ma questa è la realtà, e la realtà non è di destra né di sinistra. È la realtà. Le donne partoriscono, gli uomini no. Le donne allattano, gli uomini no. Gli uomini che vogliono figli senza una donna devono per forza pagarla e poi portarglieli via. La realtà non è di destra, è la realtà.
È questa sinistra radicale che ha perso il contatto con la realtà. Renzi nel suo libro, e anche da Fazio, ha detto che il popolo del Family Day gliel’ha giurata, e che questo ha fatto sì che perdesse l’elettorato di centro. A me piacerebbe credergli. Mi piacerebbe pensare che quelle nostre piazze che abbiamo contribuito a riempire abbiano avuto così tanto potere. In realtà purtroppo la gente non si è allontanata dal Pd perché sensibile ai valori cristiani (e caliamo un pietoso velo su Galantino che, scrive Renzi, ha dato il suo placet alle unioni civili, ma d’altra parte se per lui Sodoma si è salvata, è tutto a posto), la gente si è allontanata dal Pd perché il tema delle unioni civili che ha monopolizzato mesi di governo interessava solo una percentuale risibile di popolazione, l’1% delle famiglie, mentre il 99% si è sentito abbandonato da un Parlamento che è stato fagocitato da un dibattito che interessava solo la sinistra radicale, non il paese vero (litigare per mesi sulla stepchild adoption, quando le pochissime persone che sono disposte e possono spendere 150 mila euro per procurarsi un figlio non è che spostino queste grandi percentuali di elettorato; e in più la gente senza fare grandi studi di psicologia, senza leggere i rapporti dell’università di Vattelapesca, ci arriva a capire che i bambini vogliono la mamma, e non il concetto antropologico).
La verità è che come a difendere la linea di totale e incondizionata – sottolineo incondizionata – apertura agli immigrati sono quelli che manifestano per loro uscendo dalle loro case alto borghesi, e che non abiteranno mai fianco a fianco con loro nelle periferie degradate, allo stesso modo a difendere aggressivamente il diritto delle donne a lavorare non sono le cassiere o le commesse, ma le professioniste che hanno goduto di una grande libertà di gestione del tempo, che non sono dovute stare ore e ore incollate a una postazione mentre i figli a casa avevano la febbre, o aspettavano la mamma per finire i compiti, sono donne che sono potute uscire dal lavoro per la recita di Natale dell’asilo, essere lì quando i figli avevano bisogno senza dover supplicare un permesso. Sono le donne che hanno fatto lavori gratificanti e remunerativi o almeno flessibili a combattere perché le operaie abbiano il diritto di stare attaccate alla catena di montaggio otto ore al giorno più la pausa pranzo. Che si ricordino, le parlamentari che credono di difendere le donne, che, è vero, ci sono tanti bei lavori gratificanti, ma non per tutte è così. Escano dalle loro cerchie e incontrino la gente. E se non la capiscono più non è perché siamo diventati tutti populisti, ma perché l’ideologia ha fatto perdere loro il contatto con la realtà.
Noi donne che non ci siamo fatte lavare il cervello, chiediamo diritti diversi da quelli degli uomini, per esempio chiediamo di poter scegliere se e quanto lavorare (il diritto ad avere il part time se lo chiediamo, quando i figli sono piccoli, magari perché dei cospicui assegni familiari ce lo consentono): non è libertà anche questa? Scegliere di non lavorare? O è libertà solo lavorare, magari senza fare figli o facendone uno molto tardi? E se non è possibile non lavorare, che almeno si chiamino le cose col loro nome; il lavoro quindi è una necessità, non “diritto” o “conquista”. Dobbiamo lavorare perché ci hanno rubato uno stipendio, perché oggi pagano due lavoratori quanto un tempo guadagnava uno solo.
Anche noi, come gli autori del volantino dello scandalo, crediamo che il vero aiuto alla donna sia quello di permetterle di essere sé stessa, diversa dall’uomo. La pari dignità la diamo tutte per scontata, nessuna donna intellettualmente onesta in Italia potrà dire di essere stata discriminata in quanto donna, non nei tempi recenti. Ci sono anche donne sceme, comunque, che magari non fanno carriera per quello. Ci sono donne capaci che fanno carriera. Poi ci sono donne capaci che non fanno carriera perché non è così importante per loro, perché hanno altri interessi (incredibile, ma ci sono anche persone, uomini e donne, che hanno altre priorità), o perché non sono disposte a immolare tutto sull’altare del lavoro. Poi ci sono donne che vorrebbero che venisse data loro la possibilità di modulare il loro impegno secondo fasi diverse, quando le esigenze della famiglia aumentano o diminuiscono, non perché qualcuno ci costringa, ma perché è questo che profondamente desiderano. (Un accenno al fatto che il gender gap sui salari non esiste: portatemi un contratto collettivo in cui sia scritto che a parità di lavoro le donne guadagnano meno degli uomini: non c’è; la contrattazione personale è un altro conto, ma se gli uomini sono più bravi a farsi pagare di più è perché sono più aggressivi nel chiedere e più concentrati sul lavoro).
Noto un certo nervosismo in merito, di recente, in giro: insulti alla mamma di undici figli, articoli pseudoscientifici che dicono che un figlio toglie alla mamma undici anni di vita (io sono praticamente morta, le mie amiche Chiara e Francesca sono sepolte da tempo, con i loro 11 e 12 figli) e che rovina il sonno dei genitori per sei anni, omuncoli che affermano le donne colte non possono desiderare molti figli (le mie amiche psichiatra, filosofa ed ematologa mamme di sei e sette devono avere comprato la laurea coi punti dell’ammorbidente), insomma un’insofferenza crescente verso tutto quello che parla di famiglia. Non solo le donne non devono essere costrette a fare le mamme, come sostengono le femministe, ma se vogliono farlo, soprattutto se di tanti figli, sono delle povere dementi. Una furia contro la persona umana che non si spiega: le manifestazioni contro il comune di Verona che ha stanziato aiuti alle mamme che preferiscono non abortire sono state incomprensibili. Ovviamente nessuno ha parlato (purtroppo, aggiungo) di chiudere i reparti in cui si fanno aborti: si voleva solo aiutare chi vi rinuncia. Apriti cielo. Non solo le donne devono poter abortire, ma se invece vogliono accogliere il bambino non vanno aiutate, per le femmine accecate dall’ira. Una furia contro gli obiettori di coscienza all’aborto che non è assolutamente spiegabile con i fatti concretamente avvenuti nel nostro paese: MAI nessuna donna in Italia con la 194 ha cercato di abortire e le è stato negato a causa di una carenza di medici. Mai. Perché dunque questa furia? Perché questo odio per la vita?
Perché Zingaretti ha fatto un bando dal quale erano esclusi i medici obiettori, quando questo non è mai stato realmente un problema in Italia, visti i 120 mila aborti fatti ogni anno a spese nostre? Perché la Cirinnà grida scomposta contro la manifestazione di Verona, che sarà semplicemente sulla bellezza del matrimonio, i diritti dei bambini, l’ecologia umana integrale, la donna nella storia, dando come sempre degli omofobi agli organizzatori, quando l’omosessualità non è proprio messa a tema in quei giorni? Perché i giornali rilanciano bufale (“il governo finanzia e patrocina la manifestazione di Verona”, “ci sono relatori favorevoli alla pena di morte per gli omosessuali”)? Chi viene offeso da questo annunciare la bellezza della famiglia?
Noi non diciamo che il gay pride non va fatto. Lo troviamo inutile, perché oggi non c’è niente di altrettanto tutelato dell’omosessualità. Però chi vuole lo faccia, la Boldrini e la Boschi facciano da madrine, viviamo in un paese libero. Un paese così gay friendly (e che odia così tanto i bambini) che l’Aifa è arrivata a far distribuire gratuitamente (quindi a spese nostre) i farmaci per la cosiddetta disforia di genere a degli adolescenti, mentre i disabili sono in quasi tutte le regioni itaiane a carico della loro famiglia, un carico enorme economicamente, emotivamente, organizzativamente, nel portare il quale le famiglie sono lasciate sole. Le lobby lgbt sono l’unica categoria protetta e intoccabile, altro che omofobia. Però organizzare una marcia pacifica per continuare a dire che la famiglia è bella è offensivo?
Non paghe di avere sparso tanto odio e tanta bruttezza attorno a sé, le femministe di senonoraquando propongono uno sciopero per l’8 marzo. Una delle forme suggerite è lo sciopero del sorriso per chi fa lavori di cura e di servizio, o di rapporto con clienti. E qui scadiamo nel grottesco. Se chi serve qualcuno – pazienti o clienti – lo fa senza sorriso, perde tutta la bellezza di quello che fa. Propongo invece di fare un contro sciopero domani, e di spargere sorrisi (magari se avete i denti dritti postate le vostre foto sui social) per annunciare al mondo che siamo felici di essere donne e uomini che danno la vita per gli altri, perché la vera grandezza è servire, ed è povero e triste solo chi vive per sé.
giovedì, marzo 07, 2019
mercoledì, marzo 06, 2019
La maledizione della bicicletta
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