venerdì, agosto 21, 2026

Why Catholic Baptisms in Ireland Have Fallen by About 30% in a Decade

The number of Catholic baptisms taking place in Ireland has fallen dramatically over the past decade. In research I have carried out for The Iona Institute, we bring together figures supplied directly by Catholic dioceses, official birth statistics from the Central Statistics Office and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Census data on religious identification, and longer-term figures derived from the Vatican’s Statistical Yearbook of the Church.

The central result is clear: Catholic baptisms have fallen by approximately 30% in ten years.

In the 23 dioceses for which we have comparable figures for both 2015 and 2025, baptisms declined from 60,110 to 42,260. That is a fall of 17,850 baptisms, or 29.7%.

The decline is unquestionably connected to the falling number of births. But births alone do not tell the whole story. Religious identification has also changed, particularly in the Republic and especially among the youngest children. The balance between these factors varies significantly between Dublin, the rest of the Republic and Northern Ireland.

A large and representative sample

Ireland has 26 Catholic dioceses. My exact comparison currently covers 23 of them. Those dioceses account for approximately 87.6% to 88.1% of the Catholic population of the island, depending on the population source used for Dromore. They also represented 88.9% of the all-Ireland baptism total recorded in the Vatican figures for 2015.

The exact sample therefore covers the great majority of Catholic Ireland.

There are three dioceses not fully represented in the exact 2015–2025 comparison:

·      Cork and Ross has supplied exact figures for 2013, 2023 and 2025, but not for 2015.

·      Clogher has supplied a partial 2025 return covering 35 of its 37 parishes, but not a 2015 total.

·      Ossory has not yet supplied substantive figures.

I tested whether plausible estimates for these missing figures would substantially alter the national result. They do not.

The updated central full-coverage estimate gives approximately 67,601 baptisms in 2015 and 47,825 in 2025, a decline of 29.3%. Even under deliberately wide assumptions, the estimated decline remains between 29.0% and 29.8%.

Cork and Ross provides a particularly useful test. Its exact 2025 figure is 2,660 baptisms. Using an estimated 2015 figure of 3,541 produces a decline of approximately 24.9% for that diocese. When Cork and Ross is added to the updated exact sample, the combined decline changes only slightly, from 29.7% to 29.4%.

The reasonable public conclusion is therefore that Catholic baptisms in Ireland have fallen by about 30% over ten years.

Births have fallen—but not as quickly as baptisms

The most obvious explanation for fewer baptisms is that fewer children are being born.

Between 2015 and 2025:

·      Republic of Ireland births fell from 65,909 to 54,125, a decline of 17.9%.

·      Northern Ireland births fell from 24,215 to 19,062, a decline of approximately 21.3%.

·      Across the island, births fell from 90,124 to 73,187, a decline of approximately 18.8%.

A fall of almost one-fifth in the number of births is clearly a major demographic event. Even if the proportion of children being baptised had remained unchanged, baptisms would have fallen substantially.

But the baptism decline in the diocesan sample was 29.7%, compared with an island-wide birth decline of 18.8%.

In other words, the fall in baptisms was about 11 percentage points greater than the fall in births.

This gap is too large to ignore. It tells us that the decline cannot be explained simply by saying that fewer babies were born.

Figure 1. Baptisms in the exact diocesan sample declined more sharply than births in either jurisdiction. Northern Ireland's 2025 birth total is provisional.

The changing Catholic birth pool

The more relevant demographic question is not merely how many children were born, but how many were likely to have been born into Catholic-identifying families.

There is no official annual count of births classified by the mother’s religion. I therefore constructed a demographic proxy using:

·      official birth totals;

·      the age distribution of mothers;

·      the Catholic share of women in the corresponding age groups.

This does not tell us whether an individual child was baptised. Nor does it prove that one particular factor caused the baptism decline. It estimates how the population from which Catholic baptisms are most likely to come has changed.

For the Republic, the estimated Catholic birth pool declined from approximately 48,113 in 2015 to 32,119 in 2025. That is a fall of about 33.2%.

The Republic’s total births fell by 17.9%, but its estimated Catholic birth pool fell by roughly one-third. The difference reflects the fact that the Catholic share of the relevant population also declined.

An accounting decomposition divides the estimated Republic contraction approximately as follows:

·      48.8% is associated with the general fall in births.

·      52.1% is associated with lower Catholic identification within the relevant age groups.

·      Small changes in the age distribution partly offset the decline.

The same exercise for the whole island produces an estimated Catholic birth pool of 58,957 in 2015 and 40,608 in 2025, a decline of 31.1%.

At all-Ireland level:

·      lower birth volume accounts for approximately 55.9% of the estimated contraction;

·      lower Catholic identification accounts for approximately 45.8%;

·      small compositional effects offset about 1.7% of the decline.

The percentages associated with the two main downward forces add to slightly more than 100% because the smaller compositional effects work in the opposite direction.

This is not a direct causal decomposition of the baptism decline itself. It is an accounting analysis of the estimated Catholic birth pool. Nevertheless, it gives us a much better explanation than a rough comparison between the percentage decline in births and the percentage decline in baptisms.

It suggests that falling births are the largest single all-Ireland demographic factor, but declining Catholic identification is almost as important.

Figure 2. In the all-Ireland accounting model, falling birth volume is the largest single factor, while lower Catholic shares also make a substantial contribution.

Dublin is the most important regional case

Dublin has had the largest absolute decline in baptisms of any diocese in the sample. Baptisms in the Archdiocese of Dublin fell from 15,759 in 2015 to 9,465 in 2025. That is a decline of 6,294 baptisms, or 39.9%.  Dublin alone accounts for approximately 35.2% of the total decline recorded in the clean diocesan sample.

If Dublin is removed, baptisms in the remaining respondent dioceses still fell by 26.1%. The national trend is therefore not merely a Dublin phenomenon. But Dublin’s size and unusually steep decline have a major effect on the overall figures. Births also fell more quickly in Dublin than in the rest of the Republic.

Across Dublin City, Fingal, South Dublin and Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown, registered births declined from 19,688 in 2015 to 15,386 in 2025, a fall of 21.9%Across the Republic excluding those four Dublin local authorities, births fell by 16.3%.

Dublin therefore experienced both a sharper birth decline and a much sharper baptism decline. Even so, the fall in Dublin baptisms (39.9%) was still considerably greater than the 21.9% fall in Dublin births.

The religious composition of Dublin’s youngest children helps to explain the difference.

According to the 2022 Census special tabulation, among children aged 0–4 in the four Dublin local authorities:

·      52.3% were recorded as Roman Catholic;

·      21.9% were recorded as having no religion;

·      approximately 14.3% belonged to other stated religions;

·      11.5% had no religion stated.

In the Republic outside Dublin, 70.4% of children aged 0–4 were recorded as Catholic, while 13.3% were recorded as having no religion.

The Catholic share among Dublin’s youngest children was therefore about 18 percentage points lower than in the rest of the Republic.

This makes Dublin central to the national story. It combines a rapid fall in births with a much smaller Catholic-identifying share among young children.

Figure 3. Dublin is the largest contributor to the clean-sample decline; Meath is the second largest. Contribution shares are not local decline rates.

Meath shows that births cannot explain every local decline

Meath presents an even sharper contrast between births and baptisms. The Diocese of Meath reported 4,675 baptisms in 2015 and 2,768 in 2025, a decline of 1,907, or 40.8%. Over the same period, registered births in civil County Meath declined from 2,799 to 2,535, a fall of only 9.4%.

The Diocese of Meath and civil County Meath do not cover exactly the same territory, so these figures must not be presented as a precise baptism rate. The diocese includes areas outside County Meath, while parts of the civil county may relate differently to diocesan boundaries.

Even with that caveat, the difference is striking. A 9.4% fall in births cannot, by itself, account for a 40.8% fall in baptisms.

Dublin and Meath together account for approximately 45.9% of the total baptism decline in the clean sample. They are not the whole national story, but they are exceptionally important parts of it.

The youngest children are less Catholic-identifying

Census data provide another way of looking at the change. In 2016, there were 258,559 Catholic children aged 0–4 in the Republic. By 2022, that number had fallen to 191,571. That was a decline of almost 67,000 Catholic children aged 0–4 in only six years.

The total number of children aged 0–4 fell from 330,012 to 292,797, a decline of about 37,000. The decline in Catholic children was therefore much larger than the decline in the overall number of young children.

The composition of the group changed substantially:

·      The Catholic share fell from approximately 78.3% in 2016 to 65.4% in 2022.

·      The no-religion share rose from approximately 9.2% to 15.6%.

·      The not-stated share rose from approximately 3.1% to 8.4%.

·      The share belonging to other religions changed comparatively little.

The detailed age profile reinforces this point.

Within a comparison limited to Catholic children and children with no religion, no religion accounted for:

·      22.4% of children under one;

·      19.3% of children aged 0–4;

·      13% of children aged 5–9;

·      11.2% of children aged 10–14.

These are not shares of all children, because that particular table contains only the Catholic and no-religion categories. But the age pattern is informative: the youngest cohorts are considerably less Catholic-identifying than the middle-child cohorts.

The Census also allows us to follow broad cohorts over time. The cohort aged 0–4 in 2011 was aged 10–14 in 2022. Its Catholic share fell from 83.7% to 74.2%. The cohort aged 0–4 in 2016 was aged 5–9 in 2022; its Catholic share fell from 78.3% to 71.8%.

These movements should not be interpreted as pure individual religious switching. Migration, differences in parental reporting, Census wording and an increase in the not-stated category all play a role. Nevertheless, they indicate that Catholic identification is not being fully retained as some child cohorts grow older.

Northern Ireland follows a different pattern

The Republic and Northern Ireland should not be treated as if they were undergoing exactly the same religious-demographic change.

In Northern Ireland, the Catholic share of women aged 25–39 was 44.7% in both 2011 and 2021. It was essentially unchanged. Over the same period, the Catholic share of children aged 0–4 increased from 44.3% to 46.5%. The Northern Ireland Catholic demographic base therefore appears considerably more stable than the Republic’s.

My estimated Northern Ireland Catholic birth pool fell by approximately 21.7% between 2015 and 2025. That is close to the 21.3% decline in total Northern Ireland births.

This suggests that the contraction in Northern Ireland’s Catholic birth pool was driven mainly by the general decline in births, rather than by a major fall in Catholic identification among the relevant population.

The northern and cross-border dioceses in the clean sample nevertheless recorded a baptism decline of approximately 27.6%.

The difference between the estimated Catholic birth-pool decline and the baptism decline requires further investigation. Possible factors include changing baptismal practice, delayed baptism, differences in diocesan reporting and the complications created by diocesan boundaries crossing the border.

The important point is that Northern Ireland’s baptism decline cannot simply be explained using the same religious-demographic mechanism as the Republic.

Later baptism is becoming more visible

Comparing baptisms with births is complicated by the fact that not every child is baptised during the year of birth.

Some are baptised between the ages of one and seven. Others are baptised after the age of seven. If later baptism becomes more common, annual baptism totals become more spread across different birth cohorts.

I have sufficiently comparable age-banded information for a small group consisting of Tuam, Ferns, Dromore and Armagh. Meath has been excluded from this calculation because of concerns about the consistency of its age classifications.

Across these few dioceses:

·      infant or under-one baptisms fell from 8,644 in 2015 to 6,342 in 2025, a decline of 26.6%;

·      non-infant baptisms increased from 544 to 902, an increase of 65.8%;

·      the non-infant share rose from 5.9% to 12.5%.

The increase in later baptisms offset approximately 15.6% of the decline in infant baptisms.

This is significant. It indicates that baptism is becoming more delayed and that a simple comparison between births in one calendar year and baptisms in that same year will not capture every child who is eventually baptised. But it does not overturn the main result. Most of the decline in infant baptisms was not recovered through later baptism.

A separate timing analysis, which compared baptisms with weighted earlier birth cohorts, found that the relevant birth pool declined by approximately 18%, with plausible scenarios between 17.9% and 19.4%. That remains far below the 29.7% decline in baptisms.

Later baptism changes the timing of the comparison. It does not eliminate the underlying gap.

The Vatican figures show that the decline began before COVID

The longer-term Vatican series helps place the diocesan returns in context.

According to figures derived from the Statistical Yearbook of the Church, total Catholic baptisms on the island were:

·      72,900 in 2012;

·      67,601 in 2015;

·      63,943 in 2017;

·      57,813 in 2019;

·      43,234 in 2020;

·      55,468 in 2022;

·      50,874 in 2023.

The broad direction is unmistakable, baptisms were already declining well before the pandemic. Between 2012 and 2017, they fell by 12.3%. The dramatic fall in 2020 was therefore a pandemic interruption superimposed on an existing downward trend. There was a recovery after the restrictions ended, but it was incomplete. The 2022 total remained below the probable 2019 level, and baptisms fell again in 2023.

Scaling the exact 2025 diocesan sample against its share of the Vatican’s 2015 total gives an estimated 47,500 baptisms across Ireland in 2025. This is my estimate, not an official Vatican figure.

A separate diocese-by-diocese sensitivity gives approximately 47,825. The fact that the two different approaches produce very similar results strengthens confidence in the rounded estimate.

The longer series also supports the finding that later baptism has become somewhat more prominent. Baptisms of those aged over seven represented 1.19% of the total in 2012 and 1.56% in 2023. But they remained a very small proportion of all baptisms and could not compensate for the wider decline.

Figure 4. The Vatican-derived series confirms a pre-pandemic decline. The open 2025 point is the project's estimate, not an official Vatican observation.

Further findings will be released later

Other sections of our research will be released later. One of them show, within each religious group, how many women aged 25–44 are recorded in Census families as female parents of a child aged 0–4 or aged 0–9, per 1,000 women of the same age and religion.

The results are striking. Among the three broad headline groups—Roman Catholic, religious non-Catholic combined, and no religion—Catholic women have the highest ratios. At State level, there are 302.1 Catholic female parents with a child aged 0–4 per 1,000 Catholic women aged 25–44. The corresponding ratios are 287.6 for religious non-Catholic women and 211.5 for women with no religion.

For the wider child-aged-0–9 measure, the ratios are 481.5 per 1,000 for Catholic women, 458.7 for religious non-Catholic women and 322.9 for women with no religion. The differences are especially pronounced at ages 25–34, which suggests a difference in the timing of family formation as well as in the overall presence of young children.

Some smaller individual religious categories (Islam, in particular) have higher ratios than the broad Catholic category, so the detailed tables must retain those distinctions. The broad comparison is nevertheless clear: Catholic women are substantially more likely than women with no religion to be recorded as female parents of young children.

I will present and explain these figures more fully in a separate article in the future.

Figure 5. Female-parent-to-woman ratios are Census family measures per 1,000 women aged 25–44; they are not fertility rates.

What the evidence does—and does not—show

The research now supports several strong conclusions.

First, Catholic baptisms have fallen by approximately 30% in a decade. That result is robust whether I use the exact 23-diocese sample or estimate the incomplete dioceses.

Second, fewer births are a major part of the explanation. Island-wide births fell by 18.8%, and the all-Ireland accounting model identifies falling birth volume as the largest single demographic factor.

Third, births are not the whole explanation. The decline in baptisms was much greater than the decline in births, especially in Dublin and Meath.

Fourth, the Catholic-identifying birth pool has contracted substantially, particularly in the Republic. The number and share of young children recorded as Catholic have fallen, while the no-religion and not-stated categories have increased.

Fifth, Northern Ireland is different. Its Catholic demographic base remained comparatively stable, meaning that its baptism decline requires a greater emphasis on falling births and possible changes in baptismal practice.

Finally, later baptism has become more common within the limited diocesan evidence, but the increase is not large enough to offset the fall in infant baptisms.

There are also important limits.

Diocesan boundaries do not align neatly with counties or local authorities. Some 2025 birth figures are provisional. The Catholic birth-pool calculation is a demographic proxy rather than an official count of births by religion. Census religion measures self-identification, not religious observance. The age-banded baptism sample remains too small and self-selecting to support a national estimate of delayed baptism.

These cautions affect the precision of individual comparisons. They do not overturn the central trend.

A demographic and religious change

The decline in Catholic baptisms is sometimes presented as a choice between two explanations. One account says that baptisms are falling mainly because fewer children are being born. Another says that the decline is principally the result of secularisation. The evidence suggests that this is a false choice as both processes are occurring.

Ireland experienced a major decline in births over the decade. That alone would have produced a substantial decline in baptisms. At the same time, the Catholic share of the youngest population fell sharply in the Republic, particularly in Dublin.

The national decline therefore reflects the interaction of fewer births, a smaller Catholic-identifying population among young families and children, regional differences, and changes in when or whether baptism takes place.

Falling births are the largest single factor in the all-Ireland demographic model, but they are not a complete explanation.

The most accurate summary is also the simplest: Ireland has fewer children than it did ten years ago, and a smaller proportion of those children are being identified and baptised as Catholic.

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A shorter version of this research was released by The Iona Institute on 18th August 2026: Catholic baptisms in Ireland drop 30pc in ten years

OpenAI Codex was used to assist with collecting, processing and checking data. Responsibility for the analysis and conclusions remains with the author.


venerdì, luglio 10, 2026

How marriage helps combat poverty

 

Family stability should be recognised as a core component of any child poverty strategy, according to a new report from the UK Centre for Social Justice. The reason? Stable relationships provide a platform for economic progress.

Governments usually approach child poverty as a problem of insufficient income, the report by Dr Harry Benson argues. The standard responses are higher benefits, better childcare, employment programmes and greater investment in education. All of these may have a role, but the report, titled The Stability Advantage: Marriage, Family Breakdown and Poverty in the UK, argues that one crucial factor is too often ignored: whether a child’s parents remain together.

The report draws on the Millennium Cohort Study, following more than 3,000 couples through the first fourteen years of parenthood. Its most interesting finding is that married parents in the poorest fifth of households were less likely to separate than unmarried parents in the richest fifth, even after the research controlled for a wide range of social, economic and demographic differences.

This challenges the common argument that married couples are more stable only because they tend to be richer, older or better educated. Those selection effects certainly matter, but the report maintains that they do not explain most of the difference.

Earlier studies, it argues, often excluded respondents with missing information. Because missing data were especially common among unmarried couples and those who later separated, this approach may have understated instability among unmarried parents. When the full sample is analysed, marriage remained strongly associated with a lower risk of separation across income groups.

The economic consequences are substantial. Parents who stayed together throughout the fourteen-year period under examination were twice as likely to move up the income distribution as those who separated. Those who broke up were twice as likely to move down. Among families who began in the lowest income group, 53 pc of intact couples moved upwards, compared with only 29 pc of those who separated.

This should not surprise us. Couples who remain together can share their earnings, housing and childcare costs, support one another through unemployment or illness. Separation divides resources and often creates additional housing and childcare costs. Family breakdown is therefore not merely a consequence of poverty; it can be one of its causes.

Marriage matters because it turns commitment into something explicit and public. Through marriage, couples align their long-term intentions, accept responsibilities before family and community, and separation becomes more difficult legally, socially and psychologically. The wedding ceremony is not simply a celebration of affection. It is a solemn promise that encourages spouses to hold themselves accountable to one another.

Public policy should stop pretending that all family structures produce identical outcomes, the report argues. It recommends that the tax and social welfare system should not penalise low-income couples for marrying because it can push them off benefits. For example, if a lone mother on benefits marries a man earning say, £20,000, she would lose her welfare payment and is therefore better off not marrying him.

The report also proposes financial support during the first three years of a child’s life, when families face intense pressures and relationships are particularly vulnerable.

The main message of the report is that strengthening marriage helps in numerous ways, including financially. Any child-poverty strategy that ignores family stability addresses the symptoms while neglecting one of the most important causes.

giovedì, luglio 09, 2026

Another report confirms a rise in unplanned childlessness

 

In many parts of the world today, people are having few children than they want. A new report from Canada confirms this phenomenon. A report from The Iona Institute last week predicts that one in four members of Gen Z will never have a child. An Amarach poll we commissioned finds that average person still wants two or three children and almost no-one wants none.

The Canadian report is from the pro-family think tank, Cardus.

Canada’s fertility rate has fallen to a historic low of 1.25 children per woman, even lower than Ireland’s rate of 1.5. But this is not simply the result of people freely choosing not to have children. When Canadian women are asked about their ideal family size, they say two children on average. Men desire slightly larger families again, with an ideal family size of 2.13 children. This means the fertility crisis is also a crisis of frustrated hopes.

Similarly, in the UK, a report by the Centre for Social Justice, Baby Bust, says that nine in ten young British women still hope to have children, but that the total childlessness rate could rise as high as 30 pc under current fertility patterns. England’s fertility rate is now below 1.5. Again, the issue is not simply that people no longer want children. It is that many are not achieving the family life they hoped for.

The Canadian report also shows significant differences by religion. Non-religious Canadian women tend to desire 1.55 children, while non-religious men desire 1.83. By contrast, Protestant Christian women desire 2.91 children, and Protestant men 2.96. Catholics and Orthodox Christians are also above the non-religious average, with women desiring 2.16 children and men 2.24. Those belonging to other religious traditions report above-average desired family sizes too: 2.28 children for women and 2.23 for men.

An Iona report from last year called ‘Shall the Religious Inherit Ireland?’ also notes that religious people in Ireland want more children than the non-religious. The figures are three children versus two.

Women with conservative views are also more likely to want larger families. Ethnic background matters as well. Canadians of East Asian ancestry have appreciably lower desired family sizes. By contrast, Canadians of African or Middle Eastern ancestry tend to desire more children than the average, at 2.76 and 2.63 children respectively.

Some of the findings challenge common assumptions. Better educated women tend to want more children, according to the survey. This is important because public debate often assumes that education naturally leads women to reject larger families. The reality is more complex.

The obstacles are also revealing. More than half of Canadian women under 35 who would ideally like a bigger family report some kind of financial barrier, but money is not the only issue. Men are more likely than women to identify financial worries, while women report a wider range of concerns connected with childcare, support, and the practical burden of raising children.

This points to a broader lesson. If countries such as Canada, Ireland and Britain want to address falling fertility, they must begin by taking seriously what people themselves say they want and why their desires to have a larger family are not fulfilled.

domenica, luglio 05, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

Rieti, 12-2-’49

Caro Benigno,

come ho già scritto alla Direzione, io mi considero un Suo nemico; ciononostante La leggo sempre perché il neretto mi piace più del normale corpo 6 (attenzione, Direttore, e attenzione, proto! Ecco spiegato il successo di questi appuntamenti: nota di Benigno).

Ho aderito, in via del tutto eccezionale, a inviare una giornata del mio stipendio al Suo amico di Giano, ed ecco i conti: stipendio ed accessori L. 31.800, presenza L. 1.580; diviso per quattro persone, diviso per trentuno giorni = L. 270.

Per la mia diocesi, in questa settimana, l’on. Bernardinetti ha svolto un’interpellanza alla Camera per dimostrare che il regno della miseria è anche tra noi, più che altrove.

«Quando voi sacerdoti vi fate promotori di una maggiore giustizia sociale?».

Perché moglie e marito, senza figli, deputati, prendono L. 2.700 ecc. giornaliere? Perché tanta gente si diverte sempre ed altri non hanno neppure il pane? In Italia si balla e si gioca, e perché costoro non si professano come si deve a beneficio di opere assistenziali nell’ambito della provincia? Perché moglie e marito vivono alla stessa greppia e senza figli?

I poveri li abbiamo dappertutto e non sempre li vogliamo vedere, perché deve provvedere lo Stato; ciò può essere anche giusto. Ed allora, più tasse sui divertimenti e sulle cose voluttuarie e lasciare in pace la povera gente che mangia pane e sale, seppure.

Molti dicono che devono pagare i ricchi, ma purtroppo chi si diverte non sono sempre i ricchi, bensì giovani disoccupati ed altre categorie a cui piace vivere alla giornata, senza pensieri.

La giustizia sociale non c’è; nessun popolo, nessun governo l’ha mai attuata, non dico in pieno, ma almeno in parte. I poveri si comprendono, ma tanti che stanno bene non intendono queste cose.

Colgo l’occasione per salutarLa, assicurandoLa che ben difficilmente Le potrò dare ascolto un’altra volta.

CARLO ROSSI


Ho pubblicato per intero la lettera di Carlo Rossi, che ringrazio anche a nome del mio amico di Giano, parroco Sabato M. Corvino:

1° Per smentire una volta per tutte la voce ormai troppo diffusa che Benigno vesta l’abito sacerdotale. Magari, amici lettori, avessi la fortuna di vivere nella «grazia» perenne e fossi monsignore per giunta! Sono invece un borghesuccio che s’arrabatta a strappare la vita e un cristianuccio che s’arrampica, a fronte china, sui Tabernacoli per farsi perdonare i talenti spesi male...

2° Perché tutti prendano con le molle le contraddizioni che... distinguono il programma sociale enunciato dal Rossi, burbero benefico che fa la carità con una punta di rabbietta la quale minaccia di distruggere le buone intenzioni. Non vi sembra, infatti, che se la prenda coi mulini a vento, come Sancio, buon’anima?

3° Perché, dicendosi mio nemico, tutti sappiano che io lo considero fratello, come coloro i quali si credono — e non sono — nemici del clima in cui vive e respira il Corpo mistico di Cristo, ossia tutti i battezzati nel nome del Padre, del Figliuolo e dello Spirito Santo.

Quanto a promuovere una maggiore giustizia sociale, i sacerdoti la stanno predicando da... duemila anni in nome del Divino Maestro, che ammoniva:

«È più facile per un cammello entrare nella cruna d’un ago che ad un ricco nel Regno dei Cieli».

Del resto è il Rossi stesso a riconoscere che «chi si diverte non sono sempre i ricchi, ma gente cui piace vivere alla giornata». E qui il nostro burbero benefico ha toccato, forse, la piaga.

La giustizia sociale non c’è e non ci sarà... (e le rivoluzioni non faranno che spargere sangue innocente), finché l’umanità, cioè tutti gli uomini indistintamente, non attueranno gli insegnamenti di Chi si fece Uomo per redimerci.

E qui il discorso si fa lungo.

È significativo che i poveri — come dice Rossi — si comprendono. Perché? Lo dirò un’altra volta; ma è già evidente che senza dolore non c’è Carità.

Benigno

17 luglio 1949

domenica, giugno 28, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

 

Ecco un altro caso che non abbisogna di garanzie parrocchiali o di segnalazioni pietose. Lo sto vivendo io stesso perché conosco da lungo tempo le disgrazie che devastano l’esistenza di PADRONI GIUSEPPINA – Via Marchesi, fabbricato B, Genio Civile – Parma.

Il marito, dopo aver preso parte alle dure vicende guerresche dell’ultimo ventennio, stabilitosi in Asmara, fu fatto prigioniero e trascinò per anni la vita nei campi di concentramento.

Rientrato in patria nel 1945, trovò la casa distrutta e la moglie con le due bambine, miracolosamente superstiti, ma prive di tutto. Le sofferenze gli avevano spossato il cuore. Con gli stenti cominciarono le malattie insidiose. Una bambina è colpita da paralisi infantile, la moglie da pleurite. Egli stesso, dopo aver lottato col male, giace dallo scorso dicembre in un letto d’ospedale per pleurite con versamento ed infiltrazione polmonare.

Amici lettori, voi capite dove si va a finire se non intervenite. La bambina ha assoluto bisogno di un busto ortopedico e i due coniugi di una costante supernutrizione. Intanto i debiti li soffocano: nessuno vuol più far credito a questi paria che si sono rivolti a me...

Ma che posso fare io senza di voi?

Farete voi morire d’inedia un buon soldato, due piccole infelici e una madre sventurata?

Io credo fermamente di no. Ed ho promesso che interverrete.

Benigno

10 luglio 1949

domenica, giugno 21, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

 Signor Benigno,

il Suo Appuntamento della Carità, se fosse letto e meditato attentamente da tutti i cattolici d’Italia, risolverebbe tante ingiustizie sociali senza ricorrere a rivoluzioni inconcludenti. Il Vangelo è l’unica fonte di benessere per l’umanità.

Riferendomi ai casi da Lei segnalati, La informo che ho aperto un piccolo Villaggio del Fanciullo in Sannicandro di Bari, dove accoglierei con immensa gioia qualcuno dei ragazzi che si trova nelle condizioni più pietose.

Se vuole, può senz’altro scrivermi al seguente indirizzo:

Sacerdote Nicola Guglielmi
Sannicandro di Bari


Prendano subito contatto con Don Guglielmi tutti coloro che mi hanno scritto per sistemare in qualche filantropico Istituto bambini che non hanno padre.

Gli scriva il rag. Giuseppe Romano, che ha la moglie tubercolotica e i figli abbandonati — mi auguro — alla carità senza più «distinguo», ma semplicemente cristiana.

E gli scriva il reverendo Lorenzo Piras, parroco di Flussio (Nuoro), che mi chiede di sistemare i figli di una povera deficiente (Unali Giovanna, Franco e Civita) con una lettera che gronda lacrime e che mi riprometto di pubblicare per intero.

Quanto a «rivoluzioni inconcludenti», il pensiero di Don Guglielmi è il mio; e l’ho espresso e ribadito. Ma c’è chi ha interesse a provocarne a getto continuo.

BENIGNO

3 luglio 1949

venerdì, giugno 19, 2026

More battles to come after latest bid to liberalise our abortion law fails

 

The Dáil last week rejected an attempt to make Ireland’s abortion legislation even more permissive than it already is. The failed Bill went far beyond simply removing the three-day waiting period before an abortion, which is the big ask of pro-choice organisations. It also sought to decriminalise doctors acting outside the law and substantially widen the grounds for abortion in cases involving ‘fatal foetal abnormalities’.

The Bill, drafted by the Social Democrats, was defeated by 85 votes to 30, with Sinn Féin abstaining but some Government TDs supporting it.

Under the present law, an abortion can take place for any reason up to 12 weeks, which is when about 90pc of terminations take place, but a woman must wait three days before the abortion can proceed. The Bill aimed to remove this last protection for the unborn child in the first trimester of pregnancy.

Supporters of repealing the 8th amendment repeatedly argued that there is “no medical reason” for a reflection period but this misses the point entirely. No medical reason is required to have an abortion before 12 weeks gestation. The waiting period exists because abortion is a profound and irreversible decision involving the deliberate ending of unborn human life.

Mandatory waiting periods are not unusual in Europe. Fourteen European countries require them. For instance, the cooling-off period is seven days in Italy, six in Belgium, and three days in Germany, Portugal and Hungary.

There is also strong evidence that reflection periods reduce the number of abortions, and even if only some women reconsider during those three days, that surely matters.

Another significant proposed change in the Bill concerned the existing legal threshold relating to a ‘fatal foetal abnormality’, that is an abnormality that will kill a baby within a certain period after birth. Current law allows abortion where two doctors certify that the unborn child is likely to die before birth or within 28 days of birth. The Social Democrats wanted to replace this requirement with a broader standard and also allow abortion later in pregnancy in cases involving serious foetal conditions that may not be fatal.

This matters because the law has already been liberalised once since the referendum. The original draft legislation referred to conditions likely to lead to death “before birth or shortly after birth”. During the legislative process, “shortly after birth” was broadened to “within 28 days of birth”. The latest proposal would have gone further again.

During the debate, Minister for Health Jennifer Carroll MacNeill acknowledged that Irish women travel to England for abortion for different reasons, not only because of foetal abnormalities. Britain permits abortion on much broader grounds, including in cases involving disability or serious handicap. This means that some Irish women travel after diagnoses such as Down syndrome or other non-fatal conditions that would not meet the Irish legal threshold.

Overall, the Bill was an attempt in certain ways to align Ireland with a broader British model.

It is notable that even Sinn Féin refused to support the Bill. The party has its own legislation aimed solely at abolishing the waiting period, but it objected to other aspects of the Social Democrats’ proposals. Sinn Féin argued the Bill went far beyond the recommendations of the abortion legislation review and raised concerns about decriminalising doctors. The Bill would also have removed criminal penalties for doctors who deliberately act outside the abortion law approved after the referendum.

We should not pretend, of course, that supporting the abolition of the three-day-waiting period only is in any way moderate.

For now, this latest attempt to further liberalise our abortion law has been decisively rejected, but pro-life supporters should not become complacent. The Minister herself indicated support for removing the waiting period, and future legislation focused narrowly on that single issue may attract broader political backing. The debate showed that pressure for a more liberal abortion regime in Ireland has not diminished.

domenica, giugno 14, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

Per il caso del rag. GIUSEPPE ROMANO (Via Baglivo Uries, 42 - Napoli) ho raccolto un intero epistolario di anime buone, che va dal primo segnalatore Pietro Imperio (Napoli) al prof. Giovanni Blunda (Paceco, Trapani), a Demetrio Micozzi (Narni Scalo), a Luciano Barantini (Sanatorio Umberto I - Livorno), a Teresa Martinelli (Parma).

Merita di essere riportata, almeno in parte, la lettera del prof. Blunda, non perché sia più amara delle altre, ma perché l’egregio docente mette il dito sulla piaga:

«Per la S. Pasqua mi sono ricordato anche del rag. Giuseppe Romano. Ho ricevuto una lettera così accorata da farmi decidere a scriverLe la presente.

Quando ho letto il Suo “appuntamento” che segnalava il caso Romano, non mi è piaciuto l’accenno al suo passato di... epurato».

(Scusi: «epurato» è forse sinonimo di malfattore? — nota di Benigno).

«I fatti mi hanno dato ragione. Siamo stati solamente nove (ripeto: 9) a soccorrere quel povero disgraziato!

Come sono stato lieto dell’episodio gentile delle operaie di Lessona a favore del fratello D’Addario, così sono rimasto male nel constatare che coloro che possono hanno fatto distinzione di tessera.

La vera carità, la bontà e la fratellanza cristiana non fanno distinzioni, non usano i “distinguo” filosofici. L’esempio di chi sta in alto è veramente luminoso.

Vorrei scrivere ancora, ma temo di seccarLa. Scusi lo sfogo.

Mi creda l’aff.mo fratello in Cristo

GIOVANNI BLUNDA»

Cari amici lettori, la ramanzina del prof. Blunda (che, peraltro, dovrebbe dirmi a qual titolo, se non a quello di «perseguitato», avrei dovuto fare appello, fra tante atroci miserie, per segnalare il rag. Romano), la ramanzina — dicevo — calza proprio a pennello.

Dovrei, anzi, aggiungere una tiratina di quelle che lasciano il segno.

Non vi ho detto e ripetuto che la carità dei «distinguo», la generosità che indaga sulla tessera o la razza, si chiama, in parole non ermetiche, «carità pelosa»?

Dunque, vi sta bene il richiamo; e non cito Sant’Agostino, se no la sferzata sarebbe troppo dura.

Il «caso Romano» fa vergogna a noi tutti e il parroco Don Antonio Stella di Napoli avrà pensato male davvero degli «osservatoristi della domenica».

Dal povero «perseguitato» ho ricevuto una lettera che mi ha lasciato perplesso:

«Purtroppo, mio buon Benigno, penso che non farà a tempo a salvarmi. Mi perdoni Iddio e anche Lei; ma ormai sono stanco di questa lotta impari. Sono al bivio, ad un bivio mostruoso, ma esso salverà in un modo o nell’altro questi disgraziati che mi circondano.

Non mi si darà del vile. Una madre tubercolotica e i suoi quattro figliuoli non debbono morire per denutrizione. No, non sarà mai.

Le autorità sono restate mute al mio grido di dolore. Che Iddio perdoni come perdono io».

Bisogna dunque far presto, rimediare con un plebiscito, amici miei!

E voi di Napoli, possibile che non ci sia il modo di far lavorare un galantuomo?

Io lo affido anche al grande cuore di Mons. Baldelli della P.C.A. Il rag. Romano abbisogna di tutto.

Interveniamo prima che sia troppo tardi.

BENIGNO

26 giugno 1949


domenica, giugno 07, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

Un ricordo turbava i sonni del Padre Oreste Cerri, già cappellano militare, quando, tornato dopo l’ultima atroce guerra nel Varesotto, risentiva l’angosciosa supplica raccolta dalle labbra dei morenti sui campi di battaglia:

«Padre, Le raccomando i miei bambini!».

Più angosciosa diventava la preghiera se gli accadeva, per avventura, d’incontrarsi in uno di quei bimbi orfani, vittime innocenti della guerra, abbandonati per le strade, rimasti soli a lottare con la vita. E così, ogni volta che apriva un giornale, dove in cronache drammatiche o in commoventi vicende apparivano come protagonisti questi relitti di umanità, egli ricordava quella promessa. Aveva promesso, aveva dovuto promettere ai moribondi, ed ora l’assillava l’inderogabile imperativo di mantenere.

Sor­se così nel 1946, senza mezzi, senza programma, tra innumerevoli difficoltà, in una vecchia baracca militare, che a mala pena poteva ospitare i primi dieci bambini, la Casa dell’Orfano di Vergiate (Varese) — c.c.p. 18/32321.

Nel 1947 le prime sei stanze in muratura permisero di portare a venticinque il numero dei ricoverati, che andò sempre aumentando con la costruzione di un nuovo edificio, resa possibile per il largo credito concesso dalle ditte fornitrici e per la collaborazione degli stessi piccoli ospiti.

Ed ora?

«Si pensi — scrive Padre Cerri — che ben sei milioni di spese restano ancora da pagare, mentre si tratta di nutrire, vestire, istruire ben cinquanta bambini, giunti alla Casa col solo fardello delle loro sventure e per i quali non resta che la speranza nella solidarietà umana».

Non solo; sapeste quante piccole mani bussano alla porta, quante piccole bocche attendono di essere sfamate e implorano di entrare a far parte della famiglia! Ma per portare a termine la sua missione, Padre Cerri ha bisogno ancora di locali, arredi, servizi, materiale didattico, vestiario.

Egli rivolge un accorato appello alla generosità di quanti vorranno aiutarlo.

Accetta tutto, anche indumenti e mobili usati, biancheria, letti, utensili domestici. A proposito di letti, chi desidera onorare la memoria di un congiunto caduto in guerra può richiedere, mediante offerta, che venga intitolata al suo nome un’aula o un letto.

Siamo intesi: Padre Cerri aspetta...

BENIGNO

19 giugno 1949

domenica, maggio 31, 2026

L'appuntamento della carità

Cari amici, questa è vicenda che ho vissuto e sto vivendo io stesso. E voi potete fare a meno di domandarvi se l’appuntamento abbia veramente il volto angoscioso della verità o se qualche pietoso parroco, commosso da tanti spettacoli di incolmabile miseria, abbia «caricato» le tinte per raggiungere il benefico scopo.

Un sardo, un fierissimo sardo, rude come una tanca e incrollabile come un nuraghe, tutto fuoco e tutto gelo, a seconda che ami o che non ami, se ne andò volontario in Africa, ai tempi della riconquista della Libia, allora consentita ed oggi contesa alla gente nostra, ricca soltanto di cuore e di braccia.

Se ne andò felice di fare un po’ di largo alla Patria che adora e fece tutto il suo dovere, il che è più arduo, talvolta, dello stesso eroismo.

Una notte di battaglia la sua mitragliatrice scoppiò e una fiammata lo investì. Credette lì per lì di essere diventato cieco; ma dopo mesi durissimi di ospedale e di tormenti la vista, lentissimamente, tornò e, con la vista, la speranza.

Fedele a tutta prova alla sua missione di soldato, come sanno essere i sardi, tale rimase per lungo tempo, logorandosi di non poter più battersi in linea, dove si era meritato il segno del valore.

Congedato dopo aver servito «con fedeltà e onore» (oh, ambito certificato d’un’epoca di galantuomini!), si sposò con una brava figliola del suo paese, che presto gli diede due figli; due candidati alla fame.

Fece il falegname, il manovale, l’uomo di fatica, il rivendugliolo. Impoverito anche nella vista, vede sempre con terrore avvicinarsi la sera. (Quante volte l’ho incontrato per via, disperato di non poter continuare da solo il cammino, e l’ho accompagnato fino a casa!).

Attualmente è disoccupato da oltre un anno ed è ridotto in condizioni pietose. Frattanto, costretta dal bisogno, la famiglia si è disgregata, dispersa. Un bambino è in Sardegna presso un parente; la moglie è al servizio in una famiglia che ospita anche l’altro figliuolo.

Lui — SALVATORE COGHE, Via Santa Maura 72, scala B, int. 8 - Roma — si sfama, quando ne ha la possibilità, con le minestre dei reduci.

Così la Patria ricompensa il valore e il sacrificio dei suoi figli?

So che il più delle volte non è la Patria ad essere ingrata, ma gli uomini, gli eventi; e so pure che Coghe farebbe il più umile dei servizi per ricostruire la sua famigliola, per vivere con la sua sposa e i suoi piccoli.

Chi vorrà aiutarlo?

Chi non sa che Gesù — membro Egli stesso della Sacra Famiglia — volle consacrata al Suo nome questa cellula vitale dell’umano consorzio?

Amici, bisogna trovare pane e lavoro a questo soldato fedele e soccorrerlo, intanto, come il Signore vi ispira.

Darete una grande consolazione a

BENIGNO