How to reverse Europe’s free-falling birth rates

In 2023, there were 1.26 million more deaths than births in Europe. This downward trend is set to accelerate, despite immigration. A new paper by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies wonders what we can do to arrest, or even simply slow down this devastating trend.

This year, the population of the EU is projected to peak at 453.3 million. From then on, however, numbers are expected to decline steadily, falling back below 450 million by 2050. That might not seem like much of a decrease, but the population will be much, much older and there will be far fewer children about. (The Iona Institute has just produced a paper of its own drawing attention to similar trends here).

Unlike financial crashes or pandemics, demographic change unfolds slowly and does not produce dramatic moments that force immediate political action. Yet the trend is clear. The difficulty, the report notes, is not a lack of foresight, but a reluctance to act on what we already know.

A central driver of Europe’s low fertility rates, the authors argue, is unplanned childlessness. Many people do not consciously decide against having children. Instead, they keep delaying family formation, only to discover later that they have missed the biological window. The absence of a suitable partner at the right stage of life plays a major role.

Societies that normalise ever-later parenthood quietly increase the risk that many will end up childless not by choice, but by circumstance. In Ireland in the 1980s, the average couple were in their mid-to-late 20s getting married. Now they are in their mid-to-late 30s. That’s if they ever marry at all. Ireland’s marriage rate is now at its lowest ever level.

In this context, the report highlights the importance of stable partnerships, and especially marriage. Across Europe, higher marriage rates, earlier partnership formation and more stable unions are strongly correlated with higher fertility. There is a simple reason for this: if you marry when you’re younger, you will probably have more children. By contrast, societies marked by delayed or fragile relationships tend to have fewer children. The decline in births, therefore, is not simply a matter of money, childcare provision or housing policy, but also of how and when adults form lasting relationships.

Despite this, the report argues that public policy and public culture remain largely silent about marriage, despite its demographic relevance.

Governments readily discuss employment, housing and childcare, yet are reluctant to acknowledge the role of long-term relationships in sustaining birth rates. The authors suggest that marriage and stable family formation should be recognised as socially valuable, instead of being treated as purely private lifestyle choices with no wider consequences.

This diagnosis leads the authors to call for a cultural as well as a policy response. Parenthood and family life, they argue, should be presented in public dialogue in a more positive light, not merely as individual preferences, but as contributions to the common good. Public discourse, media and education should be more open about the consequences of persistently low fertility, from labour shortages and fragile pension systems to increased loneliness and weaker social networks. Families, the paper insists, provide a public good that deserves recognition.

The policy recommendations flow from this perspective. Beyond financial supports, the authors emphasise the importance of earlier family formation, more secure and predictable working conditions, and greater stability in housing, so that young adults can plan their lives with confidence rather than uncertainty. They also stress the need for employment, education and housing systems that do not penalise people for having children sooner rather than later. Finally, the report proposes including topics such as family life, parenthood and fertility alongside financial literacy in secondary school curricula.

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the political foundation associated with the European People’s Party, the largest political bloc in Europe, consisting of Christian Democratic and once Christian Democratic parties (like Fine Gael). Its report is a reminder that Europe’s demographic future is neither inevitable nor irreversible, but the time available to shape it is steadily running out. 

Why won’t the EU fund organisations with a traditional view of the family?

 

The Federation of Catholic Family Associations in Europe (FAFCE) has accused the European Union of ‘ideological discrimination’ after being excluded from EU funding.

In recent months, FAFCE applied for six EU-funded projects focusing on demographic decline, youth policy and child protection, areas that are among the organisation’s long-standing priorities. All six submitted projects were rejected. According to the Commission’s evaluations, the proposals raised concerns regarding equality measures and compliance with EU values.

FAFCE strongly disputes this assessment. In response, FAFCE commissioned an external consulting firm, Theoria, to carry out an independent and objective analysis of the Commission’s evaluations. Theoria examined the project documentation and the evaluators’ comments and concluded that there was nothing in the proposals that could “contradict equality requirements”, as the Commission had claimed.

Theoria’s report goes further, raising concerns about a broader pattern in how EU funding applications are assessed. “From our experience,” the report states, “after reading hundreds of project proposal evaluations, evaluators never question the definition or operational implementation of values, with one exception: when the values are proposed by Christian or pro-life organisations.” The report speaks explicitly of “evident bias in the evaluation”.

FAFCE is not the only organisation denouncing bias. The World Youth Alliance (WYA) also claim their EU funding was rejected because of their pro-life views.

The Commission evaluations cited vague shortcomings in the FAFCE’s projects, such as insufficient discussion of gender disparities, limited safeguards against discrimination, or a lack of clarity on how EU values were “made operational”. Yet, according to Theoria, these criticisms were not supported by concrete examples or specific deficiencies in the projects themselves. In some cases, anonymous evaluators deducted significant points despite acknowledging that proposals met the relevant criteria, a practice that had the practical effect of pushing scores below the approval threshold.

There is little doubt that organisations that have a Christian understanding of the family are being judged and penalised not on the quality of their work, but on the worldview they represent.

FAFCE’s president, Vincenzo Bassi, has rejected the implication that the organisation’s work is not inclusive. “We cannot be put on trial for our intentions,” he said. “Our approach includes everyone; we are against no one.” He has also warned that the funding decisions threaten the organisation’s viability, as FAFCE operates on a very modest annual budget.

Founded in 1997, FAFCE represents 33 family associations from 21 European countries. Inspired by Catholic social teaching, it works on issues such as family policy, demographic decline, work–life balance, child protection, human dignity and social cohesion. FAFCE occupies a distinctive position in Brussels: it is the only pro-family non-governmental organisation at EU level that includes the term “Catholic” in its official name, and it is the only organisation representing families accredited to the Council of Europe.

Support for FAFCE has come from several politicians and civil society figures, who argue that excluding pro-traditional-family organisations weakens Europe’s ability to address challenges such as falling birth rates, social fragmentation and the protection of minors. Critics of the Commission’s decision warn that EU funding risks becoming a tool for enforcing ideological conformity rather than supporting genuine pluralism within civil society.

Deaths outnumbered births by 1.26m in the EU last year

 

Fresh figures from Eurostat, the European Union’s statistics office, show the scale of Europe’s demographic challenge. In 2024, there were about 4.82 million deaths across the EU but only 3.56 million births, a deficit of almost 1.3m. In other words, when you compare births with deaths alone, Europe’s population is shrinking.

So why is the EU’s population still increasing? The answer is immigration. The EU’s total population grew by around 1.1 million people last year. This was entirely thanks to newcomers arriving from outside the Union.

This is what statisticians call “net migration”: the difference between the number of people moving into the EU and the number leaving it. In 2024, there were about 2.3 million more people arriving than departing, and this more than made up for the shortfall of births.

By contrast, since 2012, “natural change” (births minus deaths) has been negative every single year, meaning deaths have always outnumbered births since then. Immigration is now the only reason why the EU population is still growing at all.

Ireland’s position in these statistics is striking. In 2024, it had one of the fastest-growing populations in the EU, increasing by 16.3 people per 1,000 residents. Only Malta grew faster (19.0 per 1,000), while Luxembourg came third (14.7). But Malta and Luxembourg both have populations below 1 million people.

Most of Ireland’s growth came from immigration. Its net migration rate was 12.8 per 1,000 people, far above the EU average.

But unlike most EU countries, Ireland also saw a “natural increase” in its population of just under 19,000. In fact, Ireland recorded the highest natural increase in the EU, showing the largest positive gap between births and deaths, relative to its population. But the Irish figure is still half what it was 10 years ago.

The reason for Ireland’s relative high rate of natural increase is because it has a younger population than most of Europe.  For decades, Ireland also had a higher fertility rate (average number of children per woman) than most EU countries. Even though Ireland’s fertility rate has declined in recent years (from about 2.0 in 2002 to 1.5 in 2023), it is still above the EU average (1.38 in 2023).

But because today’s Irish fertility rate is also below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, this natural increase cannot last indefinitely. The youthful age profile that Ireland still enjoys is a temporary demographic advantage that it is gradually fading. Unless fertility rises meaningfully, Ireland will face the same pattern seen across the rest of Europe, just a little later.

In fact, the CSO has predicted that in about 20 years deaths will outnumber births here also.

Altogether, only six EU countries (Ireland, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden) had a natural population increase last year. Everywhere else, deaths outweighed births.

It is also worth noting that every EU country except Latvia gained people through immigration in 2024. But even in this picture, Ireland stands out for how much it relies on immigration to fuel its population growth.

Eurostat also tracks family trends. Across the EU, the marriage rate (number of marriages per 1,000 people) now stands at about 4.0. This is much lower than in past decades, reflecting a long-term decline.

Ireland’s figure is below the EU average, at 3.7 marriages per 1,000 adults, its lowest ever figure.

Therefore, both marriage and birth rates are declining together.