How to reverse Europe’s free-falling birth rates

In 2023, there were 1.26 million more deaths than births in Europe. This downward trend is set to accelerate, despite immigration. A new paper by the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies wonders what we can do to arrest, or even simply slow down this devastating trend.

This year, the population of the EU is projected to peak at 453.3 million. From then on, however, numbers are expected to decline steadily, falling back below 450 million by 2050. That might not seem like much of a decrease, but the population will be much, much older and there will be far fewer children about. (The Iona Institute has just produced a paper of its own drawing attention to similar trends here).

Unlike financial crashes or pandemics, demographic change unfolds slowly and does not produce dramatic moments that force immediate political action. Yet the trend is clear. The difficulty, the report notes, is not a lack of foresight, but a reluctance to act on what we already know.

A central driver of Europe’s low fertility rates, the authors argue, is unplanned childlessness. Many people do not consciously decide against having children. Instead, they keep delaying family formation, only to discover later that they have missed the biological window. The absence of a suitable partner at the right stage of life plays a major role.

Societies that normalise ever-later parenthood quietly increase the risk that many will end up childless not by choice, but by circumstance. In Ireland in the 1980s, the average couple were in their mid-to-late 20s getting married. Now they are in their mid-to-late 30s. That’s if they ever marry at all. Ireland’s marriage rate is now at its lowest ever level.

In this context, the report highlights the importance of stable partnerships, and especially marriage. Across Europe, higher marriage rates, earlier partnership formation and more stable unions are strongly correlated with higher fertility. There is a simple reason for this: if you marry when you’re younger, you will probably have more children. By contrast, societies marked by delayed or fragile relationships tend to have fewer children. The decline in births, therefore, is not simply a matter of money, childcare provision or housing policy, but also of how and when adults form lasting relationships.

Despite this, the report argues that public policy and public culture remain largely silent about marriage, despite its demographic relevance.

Governments readily discuss employment, housing and childcare, yet are reluctant to acknowledge the role of long-term relationships in sustaining birth rates. The authors suggest that marriage and stable family formation should be recognised as socially valuable, instead of being treated as purely private lifestyle choices with no wider consequences.

This diagnosis leads the authors to call for a cultural as well as a policy response. Parenthood and family life, they argue, should be presented in public dialogue in a more positive light, not merely as individual preferences, but as contributions to the common good. Public discourse, media and education should be more open about the consequences of persistently low fertility, from labour shortages and fragile pension systems to increased loneliness and weaker social networks. Families, the paper insists, provide a public good that deserves recognition.

The policy recommendations flow from this perspective. Beyond financial supports, the authors emphasise the importance of earlier family formation, more secure and predictable working conditions, and greater stability in housing, so that young adults can plan their lives with confidence rather than uncertainty. They also stress the need for employment, education and housing systems that do not penalise people for having children sooner rather than later. Finally, the report proposes including topics such as family life, parenthood and fertility alongside financial literacy in secondary school curricula.

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies is the political foundation associated with the European People’s Party, the largest political bloc in Europe, consisting of Christian Democratic and once Christian Democratic parties (like Fine Gael). Its report is a reminder that Europe’s demographic future is neither inevitable nor irreversible, but the time available to shape it is steadily running out.